Bombing to Bargain? The Air War for Kosovo

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Given the prominence of air power as a foreign policy tool, we attempt to clearly link the military process of dropping munitions on the target state to the accompanying diplomatic process between the attacker and the adversary. To explore the connection between the two processes, we look at the 1999 NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo, which allows us to isolate the influence of air power. Why were 78 days of NATO bombing needed to convince Milošević to make concessions? Comparing expectations from both bargaining models and traditional coercive models, we find that the intensity of bombing, the duration of bombing, and mediation were important predictors of the Serbian government’s behavior during the Kosovo crisis.

There are a lot of people who say that bombing cannot win a war. My reply to that is that it has never been tried … and we shall see.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris, 1942.

Clausewitz famously suggested that war is an extension of diplomacy, but many of our empirical models of conflict do not explicitly consider the relationship that battlefield engagement has with the underlying diplomatic process that will likely end the conflict. Studies of coercion are frequently framed around a clear cut dichotomy between success and failure, but numerous scholars have noted that coercive success is seldom an all or nothing proposition. In addition to this oversimplification of winning and losing, coercion is also a dynamic process involving not just the actions of the attacking state but also the responses of the adversary state. These realities of coercive episodes make them difficult to model empirically. In this paper, we make an effort to link battlefield decisions and actions to conflict outcomes.

In recent decades, the United States has greatly increased its reliance on the use of aerial bombing, employing it in the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq, in the later
stages of the Bosnian conflict in 1995, in Afghanistan, and in the Iraq War. Recognizing the central importance of air power as a coercive tool, we attempt to connect military action to political outcomes in these uses of air power, taking an in-depth look at NATO’s 1999 war over Kosovo. We feel that this case provides important insights because it allows us to isolate the military impact of air power. This work also builds on recent efforts to examine single cases in depth with highly specific data to gain a finer-grained understanding of conflict mechanisms (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009; Lyall 2009).

A diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis was proposed in late February at Chateau Rambouillet before any bombs fell, and while the final settlement terms signed in June looked a great deal like the Rambouillet Agreement, it was still necessary for NATO to undertake a two- and a half month long air campaign to convince Milošević to accept a political agreement over Kosovo. In our study, we investigate factors that may have influenced Milošević to alter his behavior, focusing on characteristics of the bombing campaign, the negotiations between NATO and Yugoslavia, and the political relationship between Milošević and the army (JLA), economic elites, and the general public. By examining the broader political environment as well as the timing and escalation of the bombing, our model helps to decipher the determinants and timing of Milošević’s turn toward conciliation.

Examining the air war over Kosovo is important for several reasons. Most obviously, this is a large-scale attempt to use air power as the key military approach to altering the behavior of an adversary state after initial diplomatic efforts failed. Secondly, from a policy standpoint, this conflict is interesting as it is NATO’s first offensive military action in its history (Narduili 2002). For democratic states like those that make up NATO, the lower risks of casualties and collateral damage associated with air power are highly appealing. Fears about casualties and an interest in utilizing technology to minimize bloodshed are likely to persist, so it is important to explore the causal mechanisms associated with this air-only campaign. In addition, the Kosovo conflict provides insight into the strengths and weaknesses associated with coalition warfare. Despite the fact that we focus on this single case, the findings concerning targeting strategies and the causal mechanisms associated with air power coercion can be applied to numerous recent high-tech air campaigns including NATO’s air strikes in Bosnia and the so-called Shock and Awe campaign of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Looking at a range of military and political facets of the conflict, we compare a traditional coercive logic (similar to the power to hurt [Slantchev 2003a]) to an informational perspective of war and find that the costs and destruction wrought by the bombing, the intensity of bombing, and mediation efforts have the strongest influence on public statements made by the Yugoslav government during the war for Kosovo. These actions provided information to Milošević about the intentions and resolve of the Western allies. Our findings indicate that as the campaign progressed and the damage done by NATO air strikes increased, the Yugoslav leadership became more conciliatory toward NATO.

### A Brief History of the Kosovo Crisis

NATO’s road to intervention in the Kosovo crisis of 1999 began in the late 1980s when Slobodan Milošević (then President of the Serbian Republic) politicized the long-standing claim that Kosovo was an essential ancestral homeland of the Serbian people. His public statements and actions heightened existing tensions between Serbs living in the autonomous region and the majority ethnic Albanian (Kosovar) population who also staked historical claim to the territory. Tensions peaked in 1987, when Milošević spoke at Serbian rally near Polje Kos (the Field of Blackbirds), protesting perceived Albanian dominance in the region. Six hundred years earlier, the Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman Turks on Polje Kos,
but on this day, Milošević exhorted Serbian demonstrators shouting “No one will ever beat you again,” (Sell 2002).

As Yugoslavia was breaking apart in the early 1990s, Milošević was rising through the ranks of the Yugoslavian government and eventually gained the presidency in 1997. His militant and ethnically biased Serbian Yugoslav government considered the development of Albanian resistance to his ethnic Serb dream to be unacceptable. In 1990, Milošević, backed by the Yugoslav Assembly, greatly lessened the rights and privileges of those living in the autonomous region of Kosovo, prompting a unilateral declaration of an independent Kosovo by Albanian separatists.

Shortly thereafter, however, issues in Kosovo were eclipsed by other events in Yugoslavia as the country disintegrated (at times peacefully and at others bloodily) into a small collection of successor states. By the end of 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords had been signed, ending the Bosnian war. Both NATO and Russian troops were deployed to the region to secure the implementation of the Accords. The Bosnian mission represented NATO’s most significant involvement in operational peacekeeping. NATO’s peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia included maintaining regional stability, an effort that was endangered by the growing crises in Kosovo. Many Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia were relocated to Kosovo, further straining the relationship between Serbs and Kosovars. Around this time, the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) was formed to challenge the authority of Serbian police in the region. The KLA frequently employed guerrilla tactics, inspiring a spiral of violence as Serbian reprisals became more deadly.

Tensions continued to run high in Kosovo, leading to UN sanctions in March 1998 and further sanctions by the Western allies in June of the same year. Diplomatic pressure was also applied including NATO’s efforts to organize the Rambouillet peace talks in February of 1999, in hopes of bringing the two sides together to accept a peace plan for the contested region. After two rounds of negotiations, the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace agreement, but the talks broke down without a signature from the Serbian delegation. In early March, United States Ambassador Richard Holbrooke flew to Belgrade in a final attempt to persuade President Milošević to stop attacks on the Kosovar Albanians or face imminent NATO air strikes. Milošević refused to comply, and on March 24, 1999, the order was given to commence air strikes, initiating Operation Allied Force.

The Air War for Kosovo

Operation Allied Force was designed to support diplomatic efforts, to coerce the Milošević regime to withdraw forces from Kosovo and to cooperate in bringing an end to the violence, and to facilitate the return of refugees to their homes. The operation was initiated with 214 American aircraft and 130 aircraft from other member nations (Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report 2000). NATO’s intervention was intended to maintain the credibility of the Alliance by sustaining regional peacekeeping efforts established by the Dayton Peace Accords.

Air power was not the only coercive option available to NATO in early 1999. Following the logic of foreign policy substitutability (Most and Starr 1984, 1989), we recognize that previous policies of diplomatic and economic pressure were all tools to be used to coerce Milošević. As diplomatic and economic pressure had failed to produce a change in Serbian policy toward Kosovo, air power was viewed as the most acceptable next step given these previous efforts. The allies felt that after the breakdown at Rambouillet, they needed to reach deeper into their foreign policy toolbox and take stronger action, but the political will to intervene with ground troops was lacking. The decisions to create these coercive
policies were intrinsically linked, and each stage of pressure reflects both domestic and international constraints.

Within NATO, there was general agreement that air power would be the next step if diplomacy failed to coerce Milošević, but according to British documents, there was little clarity as to what such an effort would entail (Ritchie 2001). Air power was chosen, in part, because of a strong belief among the Allies that a show of force over Serbia would be sufficient to convince Milošević of NATO’s resolve. So strong was this belief that no contingency strategies were developed should the air campaign fail. This faith was based on the perception that air power had played a decisive role in both Bosnia and the First Gulf War (Ritchie 2001). Previous experiences with air strikes against the FRY also influenced the decision to employ them again.

Air power was also chosen because it could be deployed quickly and minimized the risks of casualties. This decision was also likely influenced by the perceived effectiveness of limited air strikes in early September 1995 in paving the way of the signing of the Dayton Accords. The lack of a credible ground threat to back up the air campaign lengthened the war (Hosmer 2001), but a desire to hold the alliance together made the political concerns associated with ground troops highly salient. No consensus existed among the NATO countries surrounding the use of ground troops.

For the initial stage of the conflict, which began on March 24, 1999, only fifty-two targets were approved (Narduili 2002). The small number of targets is a function of two distinct forces. First, many NATO leaders held out hope that an initial show of force (of whatever intensity) would be sufficient to convince Milošević to back down. Second, the planning for the air campaign was fitful, hampered a great deal by NATO’s rules of unanimity that applied even to the approval of bombing targets. As result, many targets selected early in the campaign were added to targeting lists without full consideration of the contribution that destroying those sites might make to the whole of the campaign (Lambeth 2001).

NATO’s early bombing efforts were hampered not only by these political concerns, but also natural ones. Bad weather, in combination with the altitude requirements dictated by NATO,4 limited the number of bombs dropped and their impact of the early days of the air war. Three of the first six nights of bombing had to be canceled because the targeting technology was unable to function correctly in the extremely cloudy weather (Mason 2004). It was not until April 1 that NATO began to strike infrastructure in Serbia itself.

At the beginning of April, air attacks intensified as more planes were brought into the operation and more targets were approved. The willingness to expand the targeting list demonstrated continuing cohesion of the NATO allies and continuing resolve. Bridges on the Danube and ministries in Belgrade itself were included in this second stage.

Belgrade itself did not come under attack until later in April, in part because of disagreement about whether successful coercion was more likely to result from bombing strategic targets in Belgrade or Serb forces in Kosovo (Mason 2004).4

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2 Secretary of State Albright points out that the decision to use air power in Kosovo was driven by perceptions of Milošević’s response to air strikes over Bosnia, saying ‘he didn’t see the light in Bosnia until the NATO bomb- ing, and then he agreed to the Dayton Accords’ (Albright 2000).

3 Bombing runs were flown at an altitude of 15,000 ft which decreases targeting effectiveness. These restrictions were later relaxed, demonstrating a willingness to accept a greater risk of casualties in exchange for greater effectiveness (Ritchie 2001).

4 This battle raged largely between General Clark (US Army) and his air component commander USAF Lt. General Michael Short. Part of the disagreement may have arisen as result of differences in the manner in which the two branches of the US military perceive the role and tasks of air power. Clark advocated focusing on military targets in and around Kosovo, while Short encouraged targeting that went after the head of the snake in Belgrade (Narduili 2002).
On April 20th, NATO opened Phase 2+, which allowed attacks on TV and radio stations as well as Milošević’s party headquarters (Mason 2004). In the NATO daily briefing on April 21st, spokesman Jamie Shea noted “From now on, any aspect of [Miloševićs] power structure is deemed a legitimate target,” (NATO 1999). From this point on, the average number of sorties flown per day increased to nearly 500 compared to about 115 per day during the first month of the campaign.

Eventually, Milošević did relent.5 Several factors have been suggested as potential causes for this change of heart including condemnation from the International Court of Justice handing down an indictment for war crimes (Lambeth 2001),6 clear signals from Russia that it would not stand beside Serbia against NATO (Hosmer 2001; Byman and Waxman 2002), rising threat of a ground invasion (Clark 2001), waning public support and increased public suffering as the bombing continued (Hosmer 2001; Byman and Waxman 2002; Stigler 2002–2003), and the cumulative economic effects of the bombing threatening Milošević’s ability to buy off cronies (Lambeth 2001; Gray 2001). The intensifying bombing campaign by NATO clearly demonstrated that Milošević had guessed wrong about the Alliance’s resolve and cohesion.

The role that the threat of ground troops played in Milošević’s decision to concede has been hotly debated, with some placing a great deal of emphasis on increasing seriousness with which the NATO allies (particularly the British) discussed the ground option (Clark 2001; Stigler 2002–2003). Others suggest that ground troops played only a small role in the decision calculus because the threat existed only on paper (Ritchie 2001).7 Notably, Hosmer (2001) points to the fact that the threat of ground troops does little to explain the timing of Serbia’s decision to end the conflict. Lambeth (2001) is also quick to note that there is no evidence that the threat of ground troops alone moved Milošević to give into the Western allies. Given the ambiguity related to the role of ground troops, we focus on the air strikes and the diplomatic actions taken by NATO rather than actions not taken.

Despite the bombing and numerous diplomatic attempts from various nations and international organizations, Milošević’s ethnic cleansing activities were largely unaffected. One consequence of these actions, however, was to strengthen the ties between the members of NATO (Narduili 2002). Milošević’s doubts about NATO’s resolve began to give way when NATO aerial bombing raids depleted his power base near Belgrade. As military officials and friends of Milošević were affected by aerial bombing, their support for his resistance to NATO dissolved. Milošević’s reaction to the destruction of civilian and military targets presents an interesting case study for investigating the effects of aerial bombing strategies.

**Information and Coercion**

We compare two potential causal logics that may have led to Milošević’s decision to end the fighting and reach a settlement—the informational perspective and a

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5 The timing of Milošević’s decision surprised many of the senior air officials involved in planning the campaign (Lambeth 2001).

6 The indictment coincided with the peak intensity of the air campaign, forcing both Milošević and the Serbian people to recognize the extent of their isolation (Arkin 2001).

7 In an attempt to measure their impact, we also coded public statements about the possibility of deploying ground troops, but we found no effect when they were included in analysis. As we collected these data, we were struck by how mixed the messages were being sent by NATO on the issue of ground troops. While the British felt strongly that the threat of ground troops needed to be credible and advocated for serious consideration of their use, other leaders included President Clinton issued much more ambiguous and less decisive statements on the issue. At least from the public statements, it seems unlikely that the Serbs could have ascertained a sufficiently clear message that would have effectively altered their behavior.
more traditional view of the coercive influence of air power, which we relate to Slantchev’s (2003a) “power to hurt.” While not mutually exclusive (and, at times, complementary), these two perspectives offer a useful framework for thinking through the decision-making processes that led to the end of the Kosovo conflict.

The Informational Perspective

War is a costly means of resolving differences between states, but armed conflict is merely a step in the bargaining process rather than the end (Clausewitz 1976; Powell 2002, 2004; Slantchev 2003a,b). From this perspective, armed conflict can be conceptualized as one aspect of a broader bargaining contest. In international affairs, states struggle and bargain over scarce goods (whether tangible like territory or intangible like national security) using both military might and diplomatic savvy in an attempt to gain the upper hand (Reiter 2003). Conflict arises when states have distinctly different ideal allocations of the good at stake. Battlefield engagement can be a critical means of information revelation (Filson and Werner 2002; Slantchev 2003b).

Seldom are wars fought until one side is totally destroyed; most modern wars end not on the battlefield but at the bargaining table (Pillar 1983). In Clausewitz’ parlance, most wars are not total wars, but rather real (or limited) wars, making the negotiations that surround the fighting an essential part of the process. Taking this as a starting point, Fearon (1995) suggests that nearly all military conflicts could be resolved more efficiently if the states involved could simply identify the bargain(s) that they would both prefer to paying the costs of fighting. He also suggest that wars may be fought when the stakes are indivisible and when a lack trust between the two sides creates an inability to commit to a mutually acceptable settlement.

The war over Kosovo was a limited war, and so the negotiations surrounding the fighting are also important. First, we must consider why Milošević’s opts to fight in the first place. Milošević’s primary goal was to safeguard his incumbency. Having built his political career by evoking Serbian nationalist sentiments at the Field of Blackbirds when conflict arose in Kosovo, Milošević feared that making concessions to the international community over the issue of Kosovo would lead to domestic threats to his position. Giving up what he himself had described as the cradle of Serbia nationalism without a fight was a choice felt he could not afford to make politically. Making concessions on Kosovo would have undermined his efforts to advance Serb control in the region, and in the rump state he led following the break up of Yugoslavia. He also feared that concessions would lead to independence for the region, which would further weaken his political position domestically.

An initial attempt to resolve the conflict diplomatically failed. When Milošević left Rambouillet without signing the agreement, he knew that he risked military reprisals from NATO. There was no doubt in Milošević’s mind that NATO possessed superior forces; but he doubted the international community’s commitment to peace in Kosovo and willingness to fight for it. Moreover, he had doubts about the unity of the Alliance (Narduili 2002), and he doubted that a fractured NATO would be able to carry out a costly military operation. The Serbs hoped that downing NATO aircraft or inflict a few casualties might be enough to break the Alliance (Mason 2004), especially as US President Clinton had basically taken ground troops off the table. If NATO’s will was insufficient to support military action against him, then this external threat to his hold on power was lesser than the internal threat.

Wars occur, in large part, because of uncertainty and misperception in the bargaining that precedes the fighting. Thus, war is frequently fought in order to
provide information about the strength and resolve of the two sides (Rosen 1972; Blainey 1973). Uncertainty was a prime motivator of the conflict over Kosovo, particularly concerning resolve. While aware of NATO’s clear military advantage, Milošević doubted NATO’s willingness to incur costs for the sake of the Kosovars—a belief that was enhanced by President Clinton’s insistence that ground troops would not be used in the operation.

On the other side, NATO had its own doubts about Milošević. There was a strong feeling within NATO that something needed to be done in response to Serbia aggression against the Kosovar population given the atrocities committed during the breakup of Yugoslavia. Initially, the Alliance’s leaders believed that only a show of force would be required to convince Belgrade to back down. While Milošević’s desire to maintain his hold on power was clear, the primary motivation for NATO was less clear. Recognizing that a slow response to the conflicts that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s led to atrocities, the Western allies wanted to signal disapproval to Milošević quickly and with a single voice, but the message being sent was somewhat muddled, which strengthened Milošević’s beliefs about the Alliance’s lack of resolve and willingness to bear costs.

When the decision was made to use force, NATO had three central goals for the air campaign. These are described by General Wesley Clark (2001), who served as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe for the campaign, three military “measures of merit” guided the conduct of the air operation: minimize the loss of friendly aircraft, impact Serb military and policy in Kosovo, and minimize collateral damage. Affecting policy was only one of the priorities espoused by the Alliance. After the initial days of bombing, an additional political measure of merit was added, and it took on great importance—maintain alliance cohesion. The importance of this goal created challenges for implementing a capable and credible coercive strategy against the Serbs. Concerned about the well-being of the Kosovar population and ending Serbian violence toward that population, NATO had to be particularly concerned with acting in any manner that might be construed as inhumane. Safeguarding human rights and minimizing collateral damage were essential to maintain the unity of NATO. As a result, influencing Serbian policy was only one of the goals laid out by NATO; all three of the other goals weakened the Western allies ability to alter Milošević’s behavior.

When a crisis arises, states work to negotiate a solution over the contentious issues. If they fail to resolve the issues, the states may resort to force, but that bargaining process does not cease when fighting begins. The use of military force provides the two sides with information that will influence the shape of the eventual settlement. As the conflict progresses, the two sides update their beliefs about each other’s relative strength and resolve. Willingness to use force and to pay the associated costs provides a great deal of information to adversaries about what type of opponent they face. Milošević’s decision not to sign the Rambouillet agreement meant that more information was needed to reach a bargain over the future of Kosovo. Settlements only come about when the two sides have gained sufficient information to make clear judgments about their prospects in the war, thus making continued fighting unprofitable as uncertainty has been dramatically reduced (Slantchev 2003a).

Determining how information is revealed and processed to overcome uncertainty is important to understanding how and when wars end (Goemans 2000). If theories of bargaining and war are correct, then war-fighting can be a critical aspect of the settlement process. Formal analyses by Filson and Werner (2002), Slantchev (2003b), Powell (2004), and Smith and Stam (2004) highlight the relationship between information gained on the battlefield and at the bargaining table and how these two sources of information can diminish uncertainty. We believe that it is important to consider how the process of fighting influences the underlying diplomatic process that shapes the negotiated settlements that
end conflicts. How do 78 days of fighting alter Milošević’s willingness to settle on Kosovo? Information revealed on the battlefield alerted Milošević to the fact that the greater threat to his hold on power was because of NATO rather than internal opposition.

The Power to Hurt

After the negotiations at Rambouillet failed, NATO decided to use coercive air power to force the Serbs to make concessions over Kosovo. When designing effective coercive strategies, potential attackers must identify an appropriate instrument(s) to apply pressure, a transmission mechanism (how will the pressure be translated into political impact), and a desired outcome (Pape 1996; Byman and Waxman 2002). Air strikes must be costly to the target in order for the operation to be strategically effective (Pape 1996). Inflicting high costs with damaging air strikes should force the weaker side to concede; strategic targeting of high value locations should increase the costs inflicted. This parallels the logic of the power to hurt (Slantchev 2003a).

Focusing on the battlefield, Slantchev (2003a) points out that the bargaining range available for settlement is a product of two related costs of war—the ability to inflict costs and the ability to bear costs. While both sides recognized NATO’s superior fire power and ability to inflict costs, Milošević had doubts about the Alliance’s willingness to bear costs. The Serbian leader may have hoped that showing a willingness to fight and take costs might lessen the concessions he would eventually be forced to make over Kosovo.8

From this perspective, despite the political costs associated with loosening his hold over Kosovo, eventually Milošević was forced to surrender because he was unable to inflict costs on NATO. Slantchev (2003a) notes that NATO’s strategy in Kosovo denied Milošević the power to hurt—making it impossible for Yugoslavia to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis the Alliance. The bombing campaign also raised costs for Milošević’s political allies, making it more difficult for him to retain power (Lambeth 2001).

Power to Hurt Hypotheses

Traditionally air power strategists have believed that inflicting high costs on a target should lead to political concessions. To evaluate this assertion, we begin with Slantchev’s (2003a,b) simple story that as the costs associated with an air campaign increase, the target’s ability to absorb these costs decreases, which should lead to concession. This power to hurt idea is a testable proposition.

Hypothesis 1: As the number of daily attack sorties increases, conciliation should be more likely.

Strategic choice of targets can have a substantial impact on who bears the costs of bombing in the target state, which in turn should influence the outcome of coercive episodes. Pape (1996) breaks down air power strategies into three categories: denial, punishment, and decapitation. Denial strategies target military resources, whereas punishment strategies target the vulnerability of civilian populations.9 Denial strategies, which are believed to be more effective, aim to limit a target’s ability to take and hold territory. This aim can be met in several

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8 Milošević may also have believed he could capitalize on low expectations about the effectiveness of Serbian forces.

9 These distinctions are analogous to the nuclear targeting concepts of counter-force versus counter-value targeting.
ways—by targeting fielded forces, supply lines, as well as military production sites. Horowitz and Reiter (2001) find that denial strategies are more effective than punishment strategies. Pape (1996) views punishment strategies that target civilian populations and decapitation strategies that focus on leadership and command and control targets as largely ineffective. Drawing on Slantchev (2003a) logic, denial strategies should be more effective because damage to a target’s military capability diminishes its ability to inflict costs on the attacker.

When a denial strategy is employed, the military bears the costs of the bombing. Belkin et al. (2002) argue that denial strategies are more likely to succeed against target states governed by regimes that lack domestic legitimacy, resulting from efforts by these leaders to undermine the effectiveness of their militaries. Attackers can target this weakness to greatest effect with denial strategies. Theoretically, this strategy is effective primarily because of costs and damage done to the target’s military rather than because of the information it can reveal.

**Hypothesis 2:** When attack sorties are focused on military targets, conciliation should be more likely.

In contrast to Pape’s typology is the work of John Warden (1988), which guided US Air Force tactics in the first Gulf War. Starting with the Clausewitz’s (1976) idea of “centers of gravity,” Warden’s targeting strategy is based on five concentric rings (Warden 1988). Leadership, which he viewed as essential to any war effort, is the center ring. The second ring is key production facilities such as electricity and oil. Within the third ring is infrastructure consisting primarily of transportation and communication. The fourth ring is the civilian populations. The outside ring is fielded forces. He believed they should not be the focal point of an air campaign. Warden avers that by destroying the interior rings, life would become sufficiently difficult for those in the targeted state and that the state would then have a difficult time employing modern weapons, thus forcing concessions.

Warden’s model is also one that stresses strategic targeting to make air strikes more costly. From Warden’s perspective, it is essential that leadership bear the costs of the coercive force. There is little reason for a target to give in to coercive pressure if it is not politically costly.

**Hypothesis 3:** Attacks on inner ring targets (like leadership assets and infrastructure) should increase the likelihood of conciliation.

In several important ways, Warden’s logic is similar to that of selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 2003). Unlike Warden’s theory, which emphasizes targeting leaders themselves as well as the political structures support them, selectorate theory focuses on the political structures that keep leaders in power. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) highlight that every leader values his or her incumbency foremost and will do whatever is necessary to hold onto power. In order to do so, leaders must keep a core of supporters happy.

When an attacker begins to hit targets valuable to a leader’s incumbency, the likelihood of concession will increase. Examining US air campaigns from 1941 to 1991, Hosmer (1996) notes an adversary government must have support from some domestic elements, especially among key constituents to resist air power coercion. On the other hand, if an attacker is unable to hit targets that threaten a leader’s incumbency, then no concession is likely.

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10 Warden’s work is not a total departure from earlier work as it mirrors the Air Corps Tactical industrial web theory developed in the 1930s (West 1999).

11 While Warden notes that the air power should not be used to target civilian population directly, he stressed the importance of the people being made to feel that a war is going on (Clodfelter 2002).
The nature of that selectorate will vary by regime type, so we can imagine that different regimes have different centers of gravity that can be targeted. Hosmer (2001) notes that above all else, Milošević made decisions throughout his political career with an eye to maintaining his hold on political power. Unlike in a consolidated democracy, holding onto power for Milošević did not require mass popular support. Rising casualties numbers were less problematic than they would have been for a democratic leader. Milošević’s rule was based on personal loyalty to leader in exchange for political or economic favoritism (LeBor 2004). While Milošević drew much of his electoral support from rural areas (Gordy 1999; Thomas 1999), his ability to hold onto power was greatly influenced by the economic elites (Gray 2001; Lambeth 2001). By the time of the NATO airstrikes, the group of individuals the regime depended on was sufficiently small (LeBor 2004) that the influence of each individual was high. Hitting assets of these few had a large impact on the regime stability.

Hypothesis 4: Hitting economic targets will increase the likelihood of conciliation.

Informational Hypotheses

The previous hypotheses focus primarily on the costliness of fighting rather than considering conflict as a means of transmitting information. In contrast to his ideas about the power to hurt, Slantchev (2003b) suggests that wars end when sufficient information has been transmitted for the expectations of the warring parties to converge. The Principle of Convergence (Slantchev 2003b) indicates that the battlefield is not the only source of information in war. Countries learn about their opponents both at the battlefield and at the bargaining table. The battlefield is a noisy and clouded by the fog of war, but it is non-manipulable source of information, while information gained at the negotiating table is easier to obtain but more prone to manipulation (Slantchev 2003b). While it is difficult to observe all of the negotiating behavior that the two sides engage in, there are some observable behaviors.

If air strikes are a source of information, then we must consider the sources of uncertainty that Milosevic was facing. His primary area of uncertainty was the level of resolve of the Western allies and strength of their unity. As time passed and the Alliance continued to hold, the Serbian government was forced to re-evaluate their beliefs about the willingness of the NATO to continue to fight. It should be noted that this cannot be completely divorced from the power to hurt logic because as the air strikes continued, the costs began to mount. On the other hand, Milosevic seemed most uncertain about the duration of these strikes; therefore, the number of days that the air strikes continued can be seen as an important indicator of the resolve of the NATO alliance.12

Hypothesis 5: As time passes and air strikes continue, the likelihood of concession increases.

One piece of information that can be gained at the bargaining table is the willingness of the other party to compromise to resolve the conflict. We believe that offers of compromise, particularly on central issues, should be met with conciliation. If one side demonstrates flexibility, we believe (or perhaps naively hope) that a similar gesture of concession will be offered. This tit-for-tat strategy seems a reasonable expectation, given Milošević’s history with the West. Coming

12 This may be a matter of perception as some Serbs may have believed the longer the strikes continued, the more like the alliance was to crack. Milosevic’s initial belief that the alliance’s commitment was suspect (Narduili 2002), we think that a longer bombing campaign signaled continuing rather than waning resolve.
to the Dayton Peace conference, Milošević was ready to sign an agreement to end the fighting, but he also actively sought face-saving concessions such as the ending of sanctions to maintain his position at home (LeBor 2004). With Milošević’s attention to holding onto power and a desire to appear strong in the eyes of his domestic constituents, we believe that even when negotiating from a position of weakness, Milošević will look for diplomatic concessions from NATO before making concessions himself.

**Hypothesis 6:** When one side offers a concession on a key issue, conciliation will be more likely.

The presence of a third party can also mitigate uncertainty. The actions of third parties influenced the bargaining table dynamics, so they should be considered. While there was no third-party military action taken during the Kosovo conflict, several international organizations and neighboring states attempted mediation and offered good offices in hopes of resolving the conflict between the two sides.

We believe that mediation will affect the diplomatic process, but we are uncertain about the direction of that effect. Despite the large literature on mediation, many questions are still unanswered about what makes mediation successful (Kydd 2003). On the one hand, Beardsley (2006) finds that mediation increases the likelihood of conciliation between two sides in an international crisis. More general work by Morgan (1994) and Dixon (1996) also lends support to the idea that mediation helps to diffuse crises. On the other hand, Schrodt and Gerner (2004) found that the success of mediation efforts in the Balkans conflict of the 1990s varied greatly by who was doing the mediation. UN mediation was actually positively correlated with increased conflict in the Bosnia conflict. These competing predictions lead us to hypothesize that general mediation will have an impact, but we have no clear expectation about the direction of that effect.

**Hypothesis 7:** Mediation efforts will impact the crisis situation.

Thinking more specifically the Kosovo crisis, we know that there was uncertainty (on both sides) about the role that Russia would play in the crisis. Milošević held out hope that the Russians might stand with the Serbs as fellow Slavs. NATO hoped that the Russians at the very least would remain outside of the conflict. Actions by Russia in the Security Council had made action through the UN impossible, and this largely prompted the decision of the Western allies to act through NATO. In the end, the Russians did not take military action in Kosovo, which in itself provided some information to the Serbian government, but they did act as a mediator in the conflict. Building on Schrodt and Gerner’s (2004) suggestion that impact of mediation varied by the mediator, we look to Kydd’s (2003) insights that biased mediators are more likely to be effective. To explore this idea, we focus on the role of Russia as a partial mediator.

The most successful mediators help the parties overcome mistrust between the parties (Kydd 2006) and diminish issues stemming from incomplete information (Rauchhaus 2006). Trust is necessary for lasting agreements, and mediators can send helpful signals of trustworthiness that can reassure the parties involved. Negotiating parties seem to respond most to signals from parties that have some stake in the resolution of the conflict, but the most credible signals are sent by mediators that are perceived to have some degree of bias (Kydd 2006).¹³ Russia

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¹³ According to Kydd (2006), unbiased mediators who are focused solely or primarily are too tempted to send positive signals about credibility and trustworthiness for their information to be particularly revealing. Middling bias can also lead to doubts about the credibility of accompanying threats of force if negotiations fail (Favretto 2009).
served as this type of mediator in Kosovo. The type of mediation undertaken as well as the level of information that the mediator can bring to the negotiations has an impact on the successfulness of mediation (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Savun 2008). Major states because of their extensive intelligence gathering capabilities are perceived as possessing more useful information for overcoming information asymmetries that are often the source of conflict in the first place (Savun 2008); strong states are also uniquely capable of manipulating the bargaining space to influence the shape of agreements (Favretto 2009).

Hypothesis 7a: Mediation efforts by biased mediators will increase the likelihood of conciliation.

Data and Methods

While the questions explored in this paper are novel, several other scholars have examined daily events data in this crisis as well as numerous other conflicts. Studies utilizing this type of data have enabled international relations scholars to examine smaller, more precise units of conflict and cooperation rather than relying on aggregated monthly or yearly data.

An events based approach has been utilized in the past to examine conflict in the Balkans. Using a forecasting approach, Pevehouse and Goldstein (1999) look at the role of carrots and sticks to predict future actions by Milošević in Kosovo. Applying the inverse-triangular “bully” response model identified in their previous work on the war in Bosnia and Iraq (1979–1997) (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997), they predicted in early 1999 that a year of intense Western activity (both threats and promises) would have little discernible impact on Milošević’s behavior toward Kosovo, asserting that Milošević would neither increase or decrease the level of hostility in Kosovo in response to NATO actions.

Focusing on another aspect of coercive diplomacy, Gerner and Schrodt (2004) explore the role of third party mediation in the Middle East (1979–1999) and the Balkans (1991–1999). Concentrating on the Serbia-Bosnia and Serbia-Croatia conflicts, the authors found similar effects of mediation in the Balkans and in the Middle East. In general, third party mediation led to lower levels of conflict.

Following in the spirit of this previous work, we collected data on the coercive diplomatic process surrounding the NATO bombings in Kosovo. Having a clear question and a small time frame, we opted to hand code the data utilized in this project. For extending this work to include more conflicts, machine-coded data may be employed, especially because recent studies (particularly King and Lowe 2003) demonstrate that the performance of machine coders is comparable to that of human coders with the possibility for greater reliability from machine coding over time.

Data Collection

To analyze the impact that NATO air strikes were having on the negotiations between NATO and the government of the Former Yugoslavia, we examine the public statements made by the two sides during the 78 days of the conflict. Breaking the campaign down day by day, we explore which factors are associated...
with more defiant statements coming out of Belgrade and which factors are associated with more conciliatory statements. Ideally, we would like to be able to trace the discussions within the Yugoslav government in response to each day of bombing. As that information is difficult to obtain and challenging to translate, we have focused on the most observable signals being sent by the Yugoslav government—their public statements. While we cannot say definitely that these statements are a reflection of true intentions of the parties involved (and thus not only cheap talk), the lack of information available about the actions inside the government of Slobodan Milošević during the 1999 War makes them the best approximation available. From a constructivist perspective, the statements themselves are also important to analyze as the discussion of issues frames our thinking in ways that will in turn dictate behavior (Tannenwald 1999).

The idea of looking at public statements as a means of gaining insight into foreign policy decision making also has roots in operational code analysis. Foreign policy scholars including George (1969, 1979), Holsti (1970, 1977), Walker (1983, 1990), and Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998), have examined speeches and public statements as a way of exploring leaders’ perceptions of the world around them and propensity toward action in the international system. Our approach is similar in that it explores public sentiments by political leaders in an attempt to link beliefs and behavior, focusing on how Milošević’s perceptions about self and other influenced his policy choices in Kosovo.

The data were collected using a Lexis-Nexis search on the word(s) “Milosevic” and/or NATO that appeared in major US or world publications and news wire services. Overall, more than two thousand articles were examined. We looked for statements made by Milošević, government statements issued to the state news agency Tanjug, or statements made by Milosevic surrogates (such as his brother Borislav, then Yugoslav ambassador to Russia) when they clearly stated that they were speaking on behalf of the leader and the government.

After the statements were recorded, each day’s comments were evaluated, and the tenor of the statements being made by the government in Belgrade was coded. For each day, the statements are evaluated as being defiant (−1) or conciliatory (1). An example of a defiant statement would be Milošević’s comment to a Belgrade newspaper Politika that “NATO is going to die in the skies above Yugoslavia.” (April 17, 1999). In contrast, an example of conciliatory statement would be Milošević’s May 30th statement on state television that “the regime was prepared to accept the peace principles laid down by the G8.”

On days when no relevant statements were made, a zero was recorded. In a limited number of cases (2 days), the statements made had no dominant tone—either conciliatory or defiant—and these days were also coded as zeros. To ensure that coding this situation as neutral did not wrongly conflate two unlike circumstances (mixed statements versus the absence of statements), we re-ran the analysis and found no major differences. Given the small total number of cases, we opted to not to drop these two cases after this robustness check gave us no clear sign for concern.

Over the course of the campaign, the statements give us a sense of the behavioral patterns, shown in Figure 1 below. In all, there were 30 days when

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16 Another similar approach is leadership trait analysis pioneered by Margaret Hermann (2003).

17 Initially, we considered the inclusion of a Serbian paper, but two factors caused us to abandon this idea. First a lack of language skills hampered our efforts, and additionally we recognized that during the war, many (and perhaps all) of independent Yugoslav papers were shut down by the government (Patton 1999; Djukić 2001; Byman and Waxman 2002), so locating statements from a Serbian, but non-governmental perspective was nearly impossible.

18 In an earlier version of this paper, Pro-NATO comments were included to capture the potential effect of diplomatic rhetoric. We thank Pat Regan for suggesting the idea of looking at NATO’s concessions/compromises on the critical issue of an international force for Kosovo as a means of capturing NATO’s bargaining intentions.
antagonistic statements were made and 19 when conciliatory statements were made. While the antagonistic statements are more frequent during the early days of the campaign and the conciliatory statements occur more often during the later days of the campaign, there is variation over the 78 days.

Because of the nature of this outcome variable, the method of analysis is multinomial logit. While an underlying order may exist (from defiant to conciliatory), this method allows us to determine which factors led to both more and less conciliatory statements, but does not constrain the factors to have identical effects on the likelihood of both defiant and conciliatory statements as would be the case in an ordered model. In addition, the Brant test demonstrated that the parallel regressions assumption does not hold, making an ordered model inappropriate.

**Independent Variables**

**Bombing and the Power to Hurt**

To ascertain the impact of physical damage caused by NATO air strikes, we include a variable for the number of NATO sorties per day. We expect that as the number of daily sorties increases there should be a meaningful impact. We hypothesize that this impact will be positively correlated with conciliation *(Hypothesis 1)*. The data on the number of sorties was collected from the NATO website and augmented with information from Harvey (2006). Because we do not expect the effect of the bombing to be instantaneous, we lag the sortie numbers one day as we do with the variables for mediation and concessions.\(^{19}\) We also considered including some indicator of capabilities, but as NATO’s capabilities were largely undiminished by Serbian efforts throughout the conflict, this

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\(^{19}\) We experimented with a variety of lag structures, but found no consistent effects beyond a single lag period. Given the small N, we opted to lag only one period to maximize the data available. In an earlier version of this paper, we also experimented with splines to capture the temporal dependence, but the high level of multicollinearity caused by this method made it undesirable. Lagging the dependent variable was another means we considered for dealing with the potential for autocorrelation in the data. While Serbian actions in response to NATO’s bombing might be lagged or delayed, we are looking at public statements. Our theoretical expectation is that Serbian statements would be responsive to actions and statements by NATO. This dynamic does not suggest the kind of state dependence that would make the lagged DV approach most appropriate. We performed several diagnostics for autocorrelation and found no clear evidence of a lag structure.
variable would be a constant, adding no meaningful new information, despite
the importance of capabilities in theories of coercion.

To gain further purchase on the issue of targeting, we also collected data from
NATO daily briefings, CNN, and the BBC concerning the day-by-day description
of targets. Drawing on Warden’s centers of gravity model, for each day, we coded
whether or not the targeting lists included leadership targets, infrastructure tar-
gets, economic targets, and fielded forces. This method does not perfectly match
up with Warden’s thesis as it does not take into account his ideas about the
timing of bombing these target groups, but it does allow us to explore what types
of targets were associated with an increase in the likelihood of conciliatory
statements.

Bargaining
Because he was unwilling to sign the Rambouillet Agreement, additional infor-
mation was needed to lessen the uncertainty Milošević had concerning the
resolve and unity of the NATO allies. Believing that the Alliance would not be
willing or able to mount a sustained military campaign against him, Milošević
was willing to risk a few days of air strikes to show strength against the Western
powers. The passage of time showed that this was unlikely to be the case, so we
include a counter of the days of air strikes as a measure of diminished uncer-
tainty that should lead to concession (Hypothesis 5).20

One of the largest stumbling blocks in the negotiation process concerned an
international force for Kosovo. Disagreement centered around command, com-
position, and force size. In the Rambouillet agreement, NATO required that the
Yugoslav government permit an international force composed of troops from
NATO countries and lead by NATO commanders to oversee the safe return of
Albanian Kosovars to the region. Milošević saw this request as an abrogation of
sovereignty and “flatly refused” to sign any agreement that called for such a
force. Over the course of the 78 days, this issue was a frequent sticking point in
the negotiations. Both sides made several alternative proposals on matters of
force composition (such as allowing Russian soldiers participate, something that
NATO did not initially plan to do) and leadership (allowing an international
force under UN leadership to enter the region). We anticipate that as these con-
cessions are offered made, tensions between the two sides will lessen, and concil-
iatory statements will be more likely (Hypothesis 6).

When the final settlement was signed, the two sides were able to agree on a
monitoring system that included an international force under the command of
the United Nations. To reach this compromise, both sides offered multiple
concessions on the issue. Using Lexis-Nexis again, we were able to identify when
these concessions were offered and looked to see whether NATO concessions
increased the likelihood of conciliation by Milošević.21

In addition, because we are interested in the larger context of the conflict, we
consider diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. Using the data collection process
described above, we also coded daily efforts and offers by third parties to medi-
ate the conflict. For each day that mediation was attempted, an indicator variable
is coded one. We anticipate that these mediation efforts should influence the
statements made by the Serbian government (Hypothesis 7).

20 The inclusion of this variable also accounts for the possibility of duration dependence (Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones 2004) and deals with some of the concerns described in previous footnote. We also considered interact-
ing the days variable with the sorties measure, but again multicollinearity was problematic.

21 As a matter of simplification, for the NATO concessions we looked at offers of concession by the United
States. As the largest contributor to the air campaign and one of the countries most skeptical of Milošević’s inten-
tions, this seemed a reasonable choice. Counting multiple offers of the same concession by multiple members of
the Alliance seemed to blur the concept we hope to capture.
Prior to the conflict, Serbian leaders claimed that Kosovo was an internal matter, rejecting offers to mediate from the Contact Group, the United Nations, and the Council of Europe (Gumbel 1998). In April 1998, 73% of Serbian voters participated in a public referendum on international mediation in Kosovo. Of those voters, 95% rejected the idea (BBC 1998, April 23). BBC correspondents reported that Serbs expressed suspicion about a role of the international community, stemming perhaps from perceptions that Serbian leaders were forced to make too many concessions in the Dayton peace process. These fears were reinforced by the aggressive negotiation tactics employed by Britain, France, and the United States at Rambouillet. During the military phase of the Kosovo conflict, the European Union (represented by Finnish Prime Minister Matti Ahtisaari) frequently served to transmit information between the Yugoslav government and those of Britain and France (Agence France Presse 1999, May 24). This facilitation function was particularly important after Milosevic was formally charged with war crimes, causing the United States to refuse to meet with him directly.

To sharpen our examination of mediation, we also consider the role of biased mediators. In the Kosovo case, Russia played a critical role in negotiating a settlement between NATO and Yugoslavia. Because of the unique position of the Russians, we believe their mediation efforts should more effective because they were perceived by Milosevic and other Serb leaders as having a bias toward Serbian interests will be positively associated with decreasing tensions. After the Western allies failed to get a settlement and decided to apply military force as well as diplomatic pressure, the role of the Russians as mediators took on greater importance. Through Prime Minister Primakov and then special envoy Chernomyrdin, the Russians worked not only to facilitate discussion but also to formulate potential solutions over the issues at stake. Russian envoy Chernomyrdin on his own as well as in the company of Ahtisaari helped to formulate possible solutions to the seemingly intractable issue of the international force that NATO wished to install in Kosovo following the war (New York Times 1999, May 27). To this end, we coded daily efforts by Russia to mediate the conflict. For each day that mediation attempted, an indicator variable is coded one. We anticipate that these partial or biased mediation efforts should be positive correlated with more conciliatory statements by the Serbian government (Hypothesis 7a). Summary statistics for all the variables included in the analysis are presented in Table 1.

Results

To begin, we estimate two baseline models—one for the coercive Power to Hurt model (Table 2) and one for the bargaining model (Table 4). For both of these analyses, the base category is defiant statements, thus the coefficients should be interpreted with this in mind.

Because our hypotheses are focused on factors that increases the likelihood of conciliatory statements, the results of this portion of the analysis are most interesting in Table 2. In line with Hypothesis 1, daily sorties are associated with an increased likelihood of conciliatory statements compared to defiant statements. This variable captures the intensity of the air campaign. As NATO increases the intensity of air strikes and, in expectation, raises the costs of continuing to fight,
the Serbian government appears to have been more likely to make conciliatory public statements.

Turning to the targeting variables, we see only weak support for Hypothesis 3 and Warden’s center’s of gravity idea that attacks on inner ring targets like leadership assets and infrastructure should increase the likelihood of conciliation in comparison to the likelihood of defiant statements. As air strikes began to hit the personal assets and propaganda tools (such as television stations) of Milošević, his wife and fellow politician Mira Marković, and other political elites in the later stage of the air campaign, the regime increased its conciliatory tone. The infrastructure variable does not attain statistical significance.

There is no support in Table 2 for Hypothesis 2 or the idea highlighted by Pape (1996) that damage to military targets should be influential. Hitting industrial and leadership targets seemed to have a greater impact on the conflict than hitting military targets around Kosovo (Byman and Waxman 2000; Hosmer 2001). At least in the case of Kosovo, Pape’s hypothesis may be an oversimplification as it does not take into account the preferences of leaders and the institutional incentives that they face in order to maintain power. Aerial bombing will

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenor of Statements</td>
<td>−0.154</td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td>−1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Sorties</td>
<td>359.468</td>
<td>280.95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>Day Counter</td>
<td>39.500</td>
<td>22.661</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Concessions</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Mediation</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Mediation</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielded Forces</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Targets</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Multinomial Logit Analysis: Baseline Bombing Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Statement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Sorties</td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Targets</td>
<td>−1.787 (0.675)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Targets</td>
<td>0.908 (0.735)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielded Forces</td>
<td>0.172 (0.689)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Targets</td>
<td>−0.102 (0.884)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.014 (1.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conciliatory Statements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Sorties</td>
<td>0.003 (0.001)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Targets</td>
<td>−2.010 (0.780)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Targets</td>
<td>1.141 (0.843)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielded Forces</td>
<td>0.525 (0.797)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Targets</td>
<td>1.302 (1.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−2.601 (1.503)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>−72.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\chi^2(10))</td>
<td>20.073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes. Significance levels: †10%; ∗5%; **1%.)
be most effective when it is targeted toward that which is most valuable to leaders, which may vary from case to case, harkening back to Clausewitz’ idea of “centers of gravity.”

The nature of Milošević’s relationship with the military is also important. Traditionally, a critic of the military, Milošević reached out to the military and praised their actions during the 78-day air campaign (Djukić 2001). Despite these efforts, the military was not an important base of his political support, and the war in Kosovo exacerbated tensions between the military and Milošević as the country’s inability to inflict costs on NATO became apparent, echoing the predictions of Belkin et al. (2002).

These results may also be related to nature of the demands made by NATO. NATO’s primary demand was for the Serbian government to alter its political policies toward Kosovo, including returning the region to its former autonomous status. Stopping the violence against the Kosovars was a secondary aim on the path to meeting that primary goal. Because NATO’s central demand was political rather than military, damaging Milošević’s political power was more costly for him than the damage to his military power.

Surprisingly, the impact of strikes on economic targets is negative, running counter to Hypothesis 4. Gray (2001) notes that Milošević was under a great deal of pressure from wealthy elites, who were important supporters of his regime. Following the imposition of sanctions, which limited their economic opportunities and, in some cases, froze their assets abroad, economic elites who had long supported Milošević were frustrated by the hyperinflation brought on by the confrontation over Kosovo. Perhaps a fear of domestic political consequences made Milošević more hostile in the face of these strikes.

To get a sense of the relative impact of these variables, we have also calculated relative rate ratios (Table 3), which are equal to \( \frac{\Pr(Y = 1 \text{ Conciliatory})}{\Pr(\text{Base Category} = \text{Defiant})} \). For multinomial logit models, these odds ratios tell us how a one-unit increase in each variable influences the relative risk of a conciliatory statement compared to the likelihood of a defiant statement. A coefficient close to one tells us that the variable has little impact. Coefficients larger than one increase the likelihood of conciliatory statements; coefficients less than one decrease the likelihood of conciliatory statements.

The effect of the daily sorties variable is small in magnitude; a one-unit change only increases the likelihood of conciliatory statements by 1.004, but this variable ranges from 0 to 875. The leadership targeting variable also has a positive effect; when leadership targets are hit the regime is a little over 3 times more likely to make conciliatory statements than defiant ones. On the other hand, the economic impact variable has a large negative effect. When economic targets are hit, the Serbian regime is only a little more than one tenth as likely to make a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>RRR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conciliatory Statements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Sorties</td>
<td>1.004**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Targets</td>
<td>0.134**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Targets</td>
<td>3.131†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielded Forces</td>
<td>1.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Targets</td>
<td>3.678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes. Significance levels: †10%; *5%; **1%.)

25 The terrain in Kosovo also added to the difficulties of implementing a denial strategy. Efforts to bomb-fielded forces were largely unsuccessful because the region is very rocky and conducive to guerrilla warfare, making the small number of troops stationed there difficult to locate (Gray 2001; Lambeth 2001; Ritchie 2001).
conciliatory statement (as opposed to a defiant statement) as they would be on days when such targets are not hit, holding all things equal.

The results of the analysis of the bargaining model are presented in Table 4. Looking at the mediation variables, both are statistically significant, but in opposite direction. The effect of this variable is negative. Mediation attempts decreased the likelihood of conciliatory statements (compared to defiant statements) by the Milošević regime. The Yugoslav leader may have read the offers of mediation as international support, giving him more confidence to stand up to the West. This finding is in line with the previous work of Schrodt and Gerner (2004) on mediation in Balkans conflicts.26 Efforts from the European Union or regional players like Hungary and the Czech Republic may have been un-welcomed and unsuccessful because of their connections to NATO. Despite attempts to facilitate information-sharing, these supposedly impartial efforts may have been perceived as biased against the Serbs.

On the other hand, the Russian mediation has a statistically significant positive effect on conciliatory statements following Hypothesis 7a. In contrast to the general mediation variable, none of Russia’s offers to mediate were rebuffed by the Serbian regime. As a partial mediator, Russia’s pressure on Serbia to reach a solution to end the conflict appears to have tempered the rhetoric coming out of Belgrade. Minimizing tensions between the two sides was an important step on the path to resolving the conflict.

The day variable is also statistically significant. As the days passed, it became clear to Milošević that NATO was unified in its aim to continue air strikes against Serbia until an agreement was reached on Kosovo. This passage of time lessened the uncertainty that convinced the Serbians to walk away from Rambouillet without an agreement.

The concessions variable does not attain statistical significance. This may be attributable to challenges inherent in isolating which concessions were important to the Serbs and gaining information about the timing of those offers. On the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Statement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Day Counter</td>
<td>0.007 (0.013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO Concessions</td>
<td>-0.789 (1.281)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Mediation</td>
<td>-0.585 (0.618)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Mediation</td>
<td>1.132 (0.736)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.158 (0.579)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conciliatory Statements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Counter</td>
<td>0.046 (0.017)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Concessions</td>
<td>0.168 (1.370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Mediation</td>
<td>-3.398 (1.265)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Mediation</td>
<td>2.395 (1.284)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.913 (0.892)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-70.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2_{(8)}$</td>
<td>23.619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes. Significance levels: †10%; *5%; **1%).

26 For this variable, we only considered whether or not mediation was offered, but recent research suggests that mediation can take a variety of forms, which vary in their impact on the peace process (Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas, and Wilkenfeld 2006). A more nuanced coding of the intentions of mediators is beyond the scope of this project but might yield different results.
other hand, Werner (1998, 1999) suggests that this difficulty maybe related to the strategic way that demands are chosen. Her work provides support for the idea that terms of settlement arise endogenously in the negotiations that end wars (Werner 1998). The terms of settlements are likely to be shaped by the information revealed on the battlefield about the strength of the combatants, the costs the two sides are capable of imposing, and the nature of domestic pressures on the losing leader (Werner 1998, 1999).

Relative rate ratios were also calculated for this model (Table 5). With each day that passed, Milošević was 1.047 times more likely to issue a conciliatory statement than a defiant one. The effect of the mediation variable is negative, so the related rate ratio is less than one. When mediation was offered, the Serbian government was very unlikely to respond with conciliatory statements – only about 0.03 times as likely on these days compared to those when no mediation was offered.

In comparison, Russian mediation increased the likelihood of conciliation nearly 20 times compared to the likelihood of defiant statements. Early in the conflict, Milošević probably viewed Russian envoys Primakov and Chernomyrdin as exactly the kind of mediators that Kydd (2003) posits will be most effective. Biased mediators are more trusted because an adversary perceives them to be “on their side.” When a biased mediator counsels restraint, then that is a more credible signal than an equivalent message from impartial mediator involved in the conflict only to quell the violence (Kydd 2003). Major concessions, however, were not made until after it became clear that the Russians would not side with Serbia against NATO. One clear signal of this reality was the firing of Primakov in May of 1999 (Posen 2000). As Russia’s decision not to side with Serbia against NATO became more apparent through visits with Chernomyrdin, Milošević may have still hoped that Russian presence lead to more favorable terms than would occur negotiating only with US envoy Strobe Talbott and EU president Ahtisaari. Kydd (2003) also suggests that because the Serbs trusted the Russian mediation efforts, they were more likely to make concessions when the partial mediator told Milošević that it was time to settle.

The bombing and coercive models are not necessarily mutually exclusive. To assess both models further, we perform a unified analysis. Because the day variable and the sorties variable are highly collinear, we present two separate model runs in Table 6. Again, the base category is defiant statements and only the coefficients associated with conciliatory statements are presented.

The impact of most of the variables is consistent across the two models (and similar to the separate models presented previously). The only slight difference is that the variable for infrastructure targets is weakly statistically significant in the first model run and not in the second. Both the intensity of bombing (captured in the daily sorties variable) and the continuing demonstration of NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>RRR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conciliatory Statements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Counter</td>
<td>1.047**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Concessions</td>
<td>1.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Mediation</td>
<td>0.033**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia Mediation</td>
<td>19.973**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes. Significance levels: †10%; *5%; **1%.)

27 The correlation between the two is .76.
unity and resolve increase the likelihood of conciliatory statements by the Milosević government. Although these two variables were used separately to demonstrate the two different mechanisms (information versus the power to hurt), the fact that they are both significant highlights the link between the two models. Both of these variables underscore NATO’s ability to inflict cost (hurt) on the Serbs as well as provide information about the resolve of the Alliance.

Russian mediation also had a positive impact, while bombing economic targets and general mediation both had strongly negative effects. Again, because multinomial logit coefficients are not immediately interpretable, relative rate ratios (Table 7) are also calculated for these models to have a sense of the substantive significance of these effects.

Of interest, when considering the targeting variables, hitting infrastructure targets is associated with the largest increase in the likelihood of conciliatory statements—increasing the likelihood by a factor of nearly 9 in the first model and nearly 14 in the second. As discussed previously, hitting economic targets has a negative impact, decreasing the likelihood of conciliatory statements.

As discussed above, the mediation variables tell a mixed story. Impartial mediation has a large negative effect. When mediation occurred, the Serbian government was only 0.007 times as likely to issue a conciliatory statement (in the first model, 0.014 in the second model). On the other hand, a large positive effect in both model runs is associated with partial mediation efforts by the Russians. Another explanation for these contrary findings may be related to the function

### Table 6. Multinomial Logit Analysis: Kosovo Air Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Sorties</td>
<td>0.005 (0.002)**</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Counter</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.056 (0.022)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Concessions</td>
<td>0.202 (1.553)</td>
<td>0.295 (1.529)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Mediation</td>
<td>−4.987 (1.526)**</td>
<td>−4.429 (1.430)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Mediation</td>
<td>2.628 (1.387)*</td>
<td>2.556 (1.374)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Targets</td>
<td>−2.864 (0.977)**</td>
<td>−2.495 (0.926)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Targets</td>
<td>1.019 (0.977)</td>
<td>0.568 (0.916)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielded Forces</td>
<td>1.292 (0.952)†</td>
<td>0.809 (0.901)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Targets</td>
<td>2.196 (1.463)†</td>
<td>2.621 (1.661)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−3.372 (1.776)†</td>
<td>−4.127 (2.159)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>−61.503</td>
<td>−62.871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \chi^2_{(6)} )</td>
<td>42.51</td>
<td>39.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes. Significance levels: †10%; *5%; **1%).

### Table 7. Relative Rate Ratios: Kosovo Air Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conciliatory Statements</th>
<th>Daily Sorties</th>
<th>Day Counter</th>
<th>NATO Concessions</th>
<th>All Mediation</th>
<th>Russian Mediation</th>
<th>Economic Effect</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Fielded Forces</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Sorties</td>
<td>1.005**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>1.057**</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Counter</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>1.057**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Concessions</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>1.057**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Mediation</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>1.057**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Mediation</td>
<td>13.628*</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>1.057**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Effect</td>
<td>0.057**</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>1.057**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>2.769</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>1.057**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielded Forces</td>
<td>3.642†</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>1.057**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>8.985†</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>1.057**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>12.889*</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes. Significance levels: †10%; *5%; **1%).
that the different types of mediation provided. Many European nations within the region (such as the Czech Republic, Croatia, Macedonia, and Hungary) offered to provide information and to serve as a go-between for the two sides. These efforts were targeted primarily toward ending the violence. The regional mediators offered what Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) describe as communication-facilitation, which tend to be at the low end of the intervention spectrum. This is a largely passive activity. On the other hand, Russia had a greater influence on the mediation process offering to provide more intensive mediation—utilizing both procedural and directive strategies—which affected both the nature of the negotiation process between NATO and Yugoslavia and the substance of their agreement. These strategies tend to be more effective (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006). Having a greater interest in the conflict as well as greater ability to affect the process, Russia was able to serve as a more effective mediator (Savun 2008).

Overall, these models provide qualified support to both the power to hurt model and the informational model, echoing the idea that information from the battlefield and the bargaining table is necessary for war termination. Both the costs associated with intense daily bombing efforts (Hypothesis 1) and the gradual accrual of costs over time (Hypothesis 5) were needed to change Milosevic’s position on making concessions on Kosovo. In the Kosovo case, air strikes were least effective against economic targets, leading to defiance rather than conciliation dis-confirming Hypothesis 4. The findings on the other targeting categories were weakly positive, so the conclusions that can be drawn from them are less certain. Mediation did affect Serbian behavior (Hypothesis 7), but only partial mediation increased the likelihood of conciliation (Hypothesis 7a). NATO concessions did not seem to affect Serbian behavior, lending no support to Hypothesis 6.

In the case of the Kosovo conflict, the non-manipulable information of the battlefield was needed to alleviate uncertainty that existed between the two sides—not about capabilities but regarding resolve. The informational model is helpful for explaining the end of this conflict, but the more traditional coercive model also provides some insight. Air strikes and the continuance of air strikes provided information about NATO’s resolve, but they imposed costs on Serbia. Physical damage (and the fear of future damage) influenced the decision-making process; these costs were a more important means of communication than NATO’s efforts to make concessions at the bargaining table or influence the settlement through mediation efforts by the European Union. The targeting decisions also played a role in the coercive process. Simply inflicting costs on an enemy may not be as effective a strategy as limited costs that are carefully targeted against that which is valued by the leader and his supporters.

Conclusions

In this study, we examine NATO’s efforts to coerce Slobodan Milošević to alter his oppressive policies toward ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. To do so, we attempt to test the propositions from the bargaining and war literature against a more traditional model of coercion. Our findings illustrate that insights into the bargaining literature about the role of information can be helpful in examining war termination decisions and that they are complementary to existing coercive models. Air strikes by NATO increased the costs of continued defiance for the Serbian regime, particularly strikes against targets of value to the Serb leader and his supporters. Beyond the physical damage, the air strikes (and their persistence) diminished uncertainty about the resolve of NATO, forcing Milošević to alter his policies toward Kosovo and allow international troops into the region.

Because air power successfully coerced Milošević does not suggest that air power was necessarily the only or best choice in this case (Lambeth 2001).
Strategically, however, the use of air power was a good first military option after diplomatic and economic efforts had failed to produce timely results. Had air strikes not induced concessions, the Serbian military capacity was weakened by the air strikes. Thus, if ground troops had been inserted, the enemy would have been softened up as the Iraqi army had been by air strikes in the first Gulf War. On the other hand, scholars have noted that despite the political limitations on targeting and the perhaps unreasonable zero non-combatants casualty goal as well as other limitations, air power did perform surprisingly well in the conflict (Lambeth 2001; Narduili 2002).

This work represents an early effort to link military action (and the resultant destruction) to the bargaining process occurring on the ground. We envision several important extensions for this research. First, these findings are based on a single case. This air war is interesting and important (as described at length above), but it is still only one air war. Other recent air campaigns such as NATO’s brief campaign over Bosnia and the air power components of the two Iraq Wars may provide interesting comparison cases. In addition, we think integrating this analysis with GIS mapping techniques could further illustrate the impact of bombing operations drawing closer to the capital and Milošević’s centers of gravity.

This paper also largely ignores the actions taken by Milošević because of his inability to directly hurt NATO. His indirect efforts are notable, however. After NATO decided to use air power, Milošević strategically opted to attack the Alliance indirectly by attacking the Kosovars and attempting to create havoc with a humanitarian disaster resulting from the refugee crisis. Milošević recognized that he lacked the firepower to hurt NATO, so he tried to exploit the Alliance’s desire to avoid collateral damage and made every effort to propagandize the errors that NATO made. This has interesting implications for future wars when the distribution of power is clearly asymmetrical.

Because of the emphasis that the United States and other Western democracies have placed on air power as a coercive tool, we feel it is important to explore and to understand the mechanisms by which air power influence behavior—both on the battlefield and at the bargaining table. Traditional models of coercion still offer important insights that complement the burgeoning literature on bargaining and war.

References


