The Politics of Peacekeeping: UN Security Council Oversight Across Peacekeeping Missions

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Why are some peacekeeping mandates broad and expansive while others are narrow and well defined? Does variation in mandate flexibility reflect the needs inherent to resolving the conflict or the political interests of powerful states? The modern thread of debate surrounding UN action focuses on whether the political interests of the Permanent Five (P5) members in the Security Council or the stated goals of the institution as a whole drive UN behavior. While most analyses focus on where the UN intervenes to assess the political “pull” that member states exert on the institution, we examine variation in operational latitude across UN peacekeeping in war-torn states. Our analysis offers three main results. Powerful states do constrain international bureaucracies; however, bureaucratic independence varies with the intrinsic interests of the P5. Further, heterogeneity across powerful state preferences systematically affects bureaucratic flexibility in peacekeeping.

Why are some peacekeeping mandates broad and expansive while others are narrow and well defined? Does variation in mandate flexibility reflect the needs inherent to resolving the conflict or the political interests of powerful states? Since the 1990s, peacekeeping operations have increasingly been sent to civil wars as a tool for managing conflict. Peacekeeping has grown in scope and scale, ranging from small, unarmed observer missions to enforcement missions employing tens of thousands of troops tasked with providing security for vulnerable populations using “all means necessary,” language that signifies the use of force beyond self-defense. With the proliferation of missions, questions have arisen as to why some conflicts get missions while others do not. Various studies have shown that where missions go depends on a variety of factors, including need (for example, high fatalities) and political ties (for example, colonial relationships). Concurrently, the UN has undergone significant bureaucratization, a development that delegates functions to experts tasked with the research and day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). This structure was designed to relieve the UN Security Council (UNSC) members from management responsibilities to free up the Council for other issues. Presumably, this also allows the experts to do their jobs without interference once the tasks are delegated (Cortell and Peterson 2006). If this characterization of the UN bureaucracy is how the UN functions in practice, then any political effects should show themselves in the decision to send peacekeepers but no further, meaning the bureaucrats develop and interpret mandates and carry responsibility for outcomes. Currently, the literature on peacekeeping lacks a systematic analysis of what happens once the mission is established. Do the civil servants have the flexibility to address the needs of a fragile peace or are they hindered by political considerations? If politics exert a lingering effect on peacekeeping even after the mission is approved, then assessments of peacekeeping outcomes must consider both Permanent Five (P5) member influence and institutional preferences, treating the UN as a true, politicized bureaucracy rather than as a unified institution.

We apply a PA perspective to UN peacekeeping and generate hypotheses for conditions that motivate greater oversight in bureaucratic relationships between the Security Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). If PA dynamics govern these interactions, then we should observe systematic relationships between direct measures of political affinity and measures of oversight. Further, we consider indirect measures that capture the difficulty of the conflict, which we argue is likely to inspire greater efforts to monitor the DPKO to avoid “mission creep.” We show that the political affinity between civil war nations and the P5, as well as variation across those relationships affect whether and what kind of oversight the UNSC employs. We also find evidence that the UNSC uses oversight to control missions sent to more difficult conflicts.

Independent or Subordinate?

Are international institutions completely independent from the influence of their strongest members or are
they merely mechanisms manipulated by powerful states? Since the resurgence of Liberal theory in international relations, this question has been hotly debated across institutions. As the scholarly landscape has become more sophisticated, the theoretical characterizations and empirical tests present a complex picture of the influence strong states exert on institutional behavior.

The debate about institutional independence manifests itself in the conflict literature through a comparison of motivations for intervention. By far, the most studied are peacekeeping missions because they are the most intrusive form of intervention and also the most controversial. Thus, the question becomes one of factors influencing where peacekeeping missions are sent.

The “needs” argument focuses particularly on aspects of the conflict, often presented as a characterization of “harder” or “easier” cases, referring to factors that make lasting settlement more difficult. Various studies have argued that factors like high death tolls, large displaced populations, multiple belligerents in a given case, longer wars, and more severe violence might characterize more difficult cases. The expectation is that the UN, following its stated humanitarian goals, will be more likely to send missions to conflicts that score higher on these factors (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2000a,b, 2008; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012).

The politics argument focuses on the influence of high politics in the UNSC, suggesting that the interests of the P5 drive decisions on UN intervention. Whether measured by alliance ties, economic ties, colonial ties, or geography, these arguments are often equated with reflecting the undue influence of a few powerful states over the actions of the United Nations (De Jong Oudraat 1996; Regan 2000; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005; Fortna 2008; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). Empirical results show that on average, UN missions are less likely to go to places where the P5 have strong ties. Predicting where peacekeeping missions go is a useful first step in gauging institutional independence, but it is worth examining how the institution functions when carrying out those tasks. Arguments about institutional independence focus on increased bureaucratization as a development that has created greater potential for institutions to behave in ways that reflect broader institutional goals rather than the narrower concerns of the most powerful member states, but these arguments have been tested primarily in the realm of international economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Does bureaucracy insulate the DPKO from UNSC influence, where the principals are notably more divided than those leading institutions like the IMF? A PA framework identifies conditions under which the principals are more or less willing to bear the costs associated with monitoring the agent.

The PA Dynamic

Principal-agent dynamics have been used to explain a variety of political relationships, from the use of oversight measures in the American Congress, to leader incentives to prolong a war and even to explain international institutional design (Weingast and Moran 1983; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Weingast 1984; Downs and Rocke 1994; Hawkins, Lake, Nielen, and Tierney 2006). The latter application explains why governments delegate to international institutions and how those institutions are designed to mitigate the effects of conflicts of interest that may result in less desirable outcomes for the principal. In addition to a rigorous analysis of institutional features, the PA framework has given insights into how much autonomy “agent” institutions can achieve to pursue their own interests separate from the interests of the principal(s) (Hawkins et al. 2006).

Principal-agent models are characterized by the information asymmetry and differences in preferences between the principal, or authority, and the agent, the subordinate with an informational advantage. In the original formulation, a principal hires an agent to carry out a task. The principal cannot observe the agent’s efforts and knows that there is some chance of a bad outcome regardless of agent efforts. The dilemma between them is that when a principal can only observe the outcome, the principal cannot fully attribute responsibility for positive and negative outcomes to the agent’s efforts. She must therefore create incentives to discourage “shirking” and accept some transaction inefficiency without pushing so much of the risk onto the agent that no agent would agree to the contract (Miller 2005). This incentive structure can also be thought of in terms of oversight and restrictions that are applied to the agent as well, especially in the context of repeated interactions, or institutionalization.

The literature on institutional design and delegation focuses on the design and use of monitoring mechanisms. Principals have an incentive to delegate responsibility to their agents, who have greater expertise in the tasks a principal wants done. When possible, however, agents are going to pursue their own interests (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). For this reason, principals often attempt to monitor and/or constrain their agents, but these efforts are costly (both in terms of time and money). Because principals want to minimize monitoring costs, agents may find ways to pursue their own preferences at the expense of principal goals when monitoring is imperfect, a phenomenon called agency slack. When we add a collective principal, the result is even greater agency slack because of preference heterogeneity among these principals (Ferejohn 1986; Copelovitch 2010). Below, we develop several theoretical expectations regarding UNSC oversight of peacekeeping mission. The first section establishes DPKO preferences and connects them to conflict difficulty and oversight. The second section develops expectations for oversight and UNSC preferences, which vary depending on the political relationships between P5 states and civil war states. The third section

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2 Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) and DeRouen (2005) make compelling cases for why other forms of intervention are equally interesting for this question.

3 Based on these arguments, it is unclear whether we should expect more institutional intervention when the P5 have greater or weaker interests in a conflict. Voeten (2001) offers a formal analysis of outside options available to P5 members to get compromises within the P5. Mullenbach (2005) explores when powerful members are likely to use the UN versus other institutional or unilateral options to manage conflict. The empirical results suggest that greater P5 interest reduces the likelihood of UN involvement, but this implies that cases in which the P5 have no interest are most likely to get UN intervention. Together, the relationships between power and missions could be non-linear, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.

4 Monitoring mechanisms include all sorts of institutionalized functions, such as regular reporting, reviews by committees in Congress, time limits, and benchmarks to be met.
considers the influence of a collective principal and heterogeneity among the P5 in generating agency slack in the UN. We argue that the procedures for maintaining an existing mission allow “outlier” members to mitigate agency slack to some extent, which implies that these procedures will be invoked more frequently when heterogeneity is high.

**Preferences in the UN Bureaucracy**

A PA framework generally presents the preferences of the principal and agent in stark contrast to each other, highlighting the dilemmas created by informational asymmetry and probabilistic outcomes. Both dilemmas apply in this relationship, but, as we argue below, the UNSC’s (principals’) preferences vary from conflict to conflict, reflecting either intense interest or apathy toward a particular conflict, while the DPKO’s preferences are constant once a mission is approved. Below, we describe the sources of DPKO and UNSC preferences in greater detail and develop expectations for relationships between indicators of DPKO preferences, UNSC preferences, and the latitude granted to a mission.

**DPKO (Agent) Preferences**

Early work on the preferences of international bureaucracies suggests functional goals like maximizing budget, staff, and independence (Vaubel 1996). Gould (2006) offers a refinement of this perspective, focusing on the similar experiences and education shared by the staff of the IMF. Because international civil servants are typically experts in their fields, they prefer to see their organizations succeed at their missions. Success is crucial for justifying the continued existence and support of the bureaucratic branches of the institution. Political officers from the DPKO have expressed concerns about how peacekeeping behavior and outcomes influence the willingness of states to continue funding missions and contributing troops. Phillip Corwin’s memoirs on the UN’s role in the Bosnian war repeatedly stressed the need to appear impartial to encourage cooperation and support, which he and Boutros Boutros-Ghali independently identified as crucial to peacekeeping success. In response to imminent NATO bombing, Corwin revealed that the actions threatened UN impartiality, jeopardizing belligerent cooperation and future support for missions from financial and troop-contributing countries (Corwin 1999). UN bureaucrats also pursue altruistic institutional goals such as reducing human suffering and finding ways to bring about lasting peace. Thus, success as the primary objective has two interdependent motivators: altruistic goals and self-interested, functional concerns.

Given the focus on success, it is problematic to assume, as prior studies have done, that the Secretariat always prefers to send missions where needs are greatest. The Secretariat does not always support sending a mission, particularly when it has been unable to secure the estimated resources to conduct the mission successfully. For example, Boutros-Ghali (1999) did not support a mission in Bosnia because the belligerents had not reached a settlement, which made the task of peacekeeping impossible without huge numbers of troops. At the initiation stage, the DPKO may or may not support a mission, but once the mission is approved, the DPKO has clear incentives to invest as much as possible to make it successful. This characterization of the DPKO illustrates the advantages of focusing on approved missions to test bureaucratic independence.

If civil servants are most concerned with producing successful outcomes like lasting peace, then they will devote resources to addressing the difficulties in a given peacekeeping situation. A natural expectation would be that more difficult situations will require greater resources and on-the-ground adaptation to resolve successfully. Howard (2008) demonstrates a positive connection between mission success and the ability of the Secretariat to adapt to changing situations on the ground, what she calls “first-level learning.” Given that the Secretariat’s goal is to conduct a successful mission, greater flexibility gives the DPKO more time and freedom to adapt to unpredictability that follows civil wars.

We capture the DPKO’s ability to pursue its own interests based on variation across difficulty measures and their systematic relationship to UNSC monitoring mechanisms, particularly mandate time limits and specificity. What is the connection between conflict difficulty and oversight? Institutional independence implies a null hypothesis for measures of conflict difficulty. A principal that fully delegates to the agent will, in theory, employ no monitoring to avoid oversight costs. The Security Council does monitor, but they may be willing to allow a large degree of flexibility once a mission is approved. We might expect monitoring to be roughly the same from conflict to conflict (such as a report every 6 months or some other standard operating procedure) regardless of the degree of difficulty. If, however, the Security Council is concerned that the DPKO will pursue its own interests beyond what the Council collectively prefers, then the PA model suggests it will impose greater restrictions as conflicts become more difficult to prevent mission creep, which represents both increasing costs and interference beyond what the political relationship between Council members and the civil war state will allow. We develop the latter reasoning further in the next section.

**Hypothesis 1a:** An independent bureaucracy will be subject to the same monitoring measures irrespective of conflict difficulty.

**Hypothesis 1b:** A managed bureaucracy will experience greater monitoring under more difficult conflict conditions to control mission creep.

**UN Security Council (Principal) Preferences**

The Security Council may have several competing interests that shape their preferences over a particular conflict. We approach the sources of political influence from two directions. First, we consider direct relationships between P5 nations and a country experiencing civil war. We then turn to the political relationships among the P5, with respect to the country in question. The PA framework offers hypotheses for both categories of relationships.

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5 Ideally, we would compare Secretariat recommendations to approved mission parameters to gauge P5 interference in peacekeeping. Several accounts of UN decision making, however, suggest DPKO recommendations have already taken P5 interests into account. See for example, Holbrooke (1998), Boutros-Ghali (1999), and Barnett (2002), each of which presents the Secretariat in a different light, but all of which acknowledge detailed discussion between P5 delegations and the Secretariat prior to formal UNSC actions.
Generally, the Security Council wants long-term stability after conflicts, but P5 states also have more or less intense interests in a country experiencing civil war that may influence P5 willingness to invest UN resources in a conflict. P5 member states often have powerful political and/or economic interests that warrant more involvement in a conflict. Just as studies of the IMF have argued that IMF lending goes to states in which American banks have a strong presence, peacekeeping may be more likely in places where the P5 have national interests invested and would benefit from conflict resolution directly (Broz and Hawes 2006). They may also have standing political, historical, or regional relationships that justify greater intervention, such as civil wars that break out in former colonies or in countries with which one or more of the P5 have an alliance. In these cases, we would expect the Security Council to be more tolerant of DPKO efforts and more willing to allow latitude in both the scope and operation of a mission because the DPKO has incentives to bring the conflict to peaceful resolution.

If political or economic ties are weak, however, P5 members may be more interested in containing costs and therefore impose greater restrictions on the DPKO. This is particularly true if a P5 nation has troops in the field or has troops serving the UN in other places. For example, US reluctance to invest more UN resources in Rwanda is often attributed to the troop deaths that occurred in Somalia when eighteen US soldiers died in an attack in Mogadishu (Jones 2001; Barnett 2002; Howard 2008). Further, Jones (2001) points out that each member has priorities for where they want UN investments to go, so they are dividing finite resources across many areas needing attention. Thus, for places where P5 members have lower interest, the costs of missions to those places may be under higher scrutiny and greatly restricted to benefit other UN missions. Where political ties are tenuous, the Security Council will impose greater oversight of the DPKO in these missions. But costs are less likely to matter as P5 political and economic interests intensify.

The collective preferences of the Security Council vary across conflicts and time. This allows us to test whether cross-sectional variation in the parochial interests of the P5 corresponds to variation in oversight or how much they try to manage the DPKO in carrying out a mission mandate. If the Security Council knows the DPKO wants to succeed and prefers more investment to achieve that outcome, then the Council will be less likely to impose unusual constraints when the Council’s interest in a conflict state is stronger and may even allow for unusual flexibility. Conversely, when Council interest is low, we expect more frequent and intrusive oversight to prevent the DPKO from investing too much in a conflict. If bureaucratization has increased the independence of institutional staff, however, then we should expect to see no systematic relationship between P5 interests and oversight.

**Hypothesis 2a:** If the UN bureaucracy is independent, then no systematic relationship between political ties and monitoring exists.

**Hypothesis 2b:** If P5 interests influence the bureaucracy, then tenuous political ties between P5 nations and a civil war nation implies greater monitoring and control by the Security Council.

### Heterogeneity of Preferences

An extension of the PA model considers how a collective principal may complicate the PA relationship. Because the Security Council is not a unitary actor but must issue resolutions as though it is, the member states must agree on what they will allow the DPKO to do with a given mission. Friction at times has arisen between P5 states over new interest in a more expansive vision of peacekeeping. China and Russia, for example, have repeatedly expressed a desire for traditional peacekeeping over nontraditional missions (Fravel 1996; McNeill 1997). Both countries have expressed concerns about peacekeepers being used to under the guise of humanitarianism to justify violations of national sovereignty (Rogers 2007). In situations where heterogeneity was especially high—Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2004—the United States and its allies opted to work primarily outside of the UN to maintain greater influence over action taken in these states (Neack 2004). Only after military actions were largely concluded were UN actors invited to take a meaningful role in postwar intervention.

Preferences among members of the Security Council vary by issue, leading to coordination problems. When preference heterogeneity is high among a group of states, collective PA theory predicts that agreement will prove more difficult to reach than when preferences are very close. Thus, delegation happens by “accident” as resolutions are harder to pass. When group preferences are varied, states will be less likely to revise a delegation relationship (Hawkins et al. 2006; Copelovitch 2010). This is a problem unique to collective principals like the Security Council. The Council must agree to any substantive changes to the mission (increasing troops, budget, expanding mandate duties, etc.), which is likely to be more difficult when there is high heterogeneity. But wide variety in P5 preferences is also likely to generate more attempts to monitor the mission. These relationships create complex expectations for our measures of DPKO latitude. The most direct expectation is that when the P5 have disparate preferences, they will employ monitoring mechanisms more frequently, most directly implying that missions will undergo review more often, so extensions will be shorter.6

Greater heterogeneity may result in agency slack simply because in defining a mission, the specifics will be harder to negotiate and agree on for the P5, leading to more general mandates with fewer constraints on the DPKO by default. Thus, we expect that greater heterogeneity among the P5 results in less specific resolutions passed in a given mission, reflecting *de facto* delegation to the DPKO.

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6 There is a related literature dedicated to the role governments play as “agent” to their domestic populations that influence their behavior in international institutions (Broz and Hawes 2006; Lyne, Nielsen, and Tierney 2006). Chapman (2011) examines UNSC resolutions as a signal to domestic populations about leaders’ foreign policy goals. Scott Gartner has conducted experiments to show how casualty trends influence domestic support for war (Gartner 2008a,b).

7 Short extensions are easier to agree to than significant, substantive shifts in mission duties. They tend to happen under time pressure, so even if substantive changes are omitted from the resolution, an extension must be issued to maintain the mission.
Hypothesis 3: Greater heterogeneity among P5 interests in a civil war state leads to more frequent mandate reviews in a peacekeeping mission.

Hypothesis 4: Mandates are less specific as heterogeneity increases.

Research Design

To explain variation in mandate flexibility, we collected information on the UNSC’s formal channels for monitoring and adjusting all aspects of peacekeeping missions, specifically Security Council resolutions. We consider both the frequency and interpretability of these resolutions to capture the ways the UNSC monitors peacekeeping missions. For this analysis, we focus on civil conflicts rather than interstate conflicts. The methods, goals, and tasks of missions in civil conflicts have the potential to be more involved since interstate peacekeeping usually does not have a state-building aspect to the final outcome of the conflict.

Dependent Variables

For this analysis, we use several dependent variables to examine peacekeeping oversight. One of the clearest ways that the Security Council sets boundaries on peacekeeping is by establishing time limits. Time limits are typically accompanied by a request for an update at the end of the period to help the Council decide whether to alter the mandate, grant more time, or withdraw. First, we consider the length of the time limits. Often, these extensions are issued in 3-, 6-, or 12-month time periods, though there are also cases of extensions that fall in between these values. The average length of a mission extension is 4.3 months, while the modal value is 6 months.

On the other hand, not all missions have time limits. The countries where missions are created without time limits are likely to have a unique relationship with members of the Security Council, so we also model whether a mission has an associated time limit. To gain further insight into the oversight process, we also examine the determinants of short extensions. Shorter extensions represent more effort to monitor since a report is required before any subsequent renewal. Longer time limits allow greater flexibility and represent a greater degree of delegation.

The last dependent variable captures the specificity of the resolutions passed. Because the Security Council must approve the content of the mission as well as its duration, the extent to which the Security Council specifically defines the duties of the mission suggests a greater attempt to control mission activities. This measure allows us to capture the limits put on a mission and directed at the DPKO, separating out the signals and reprimands the Security Council may also be trying to send to the belligerents. Each resolution passed dealing with a particular peacekeeping mission is coded from 0 to 4. The lowest level of specificity is assigned for resolutions that only include time extensions, offering no further details about the tasks to be performed. Low to moderate specificity resolutions renew or review responsibilities of the mission or the Secretary-General. Moderate to high levels of specificity include requests for coordination with specific other organizations/regional actors or proposes to do an independent review of a mission. An example is Resolution 814, where the Council clarified humanitarian tasks to be performed in Somalia and requested coordination with various NGOs, including the Red Cross. Finally, the highest level of specificity clearly lays out responsibilities and a chain of command for precise tasks in areas including security, political processes, electoral processes, human rights, etc. For example, Resolution 1542 delineates the exact political, electoral, and security responsibilities of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. It should be noted that the specificity coding only deals with new information in the resolution. This is significant as many peacekeeping resolutions often contain a great deal of instruction and information from previous resolutions.

Independent Variables

Our goal is to identify what factors best explain the degree of flexibility of peacekeeping mandates. Our PA framework offers predicted relationships between the interests of the P5 and their efforts to manage the DPKO, which is interested in institutional survival as its primary goal, creating the potential for clashing preferences. Alternative explanations are also plausible. Below, we discuss the variables and expected relationships that would confirm our hypotheses as well as variables that capture alternative explanations for variation across mandate flexibility.

To measure UNSC preferences, we use the mean value of affinity scores between P5 nations and the civil war country. If political relationships determine how tolerant the UNSC is of mission costs, then lower affinity implies greater restrictions, and increased monitoring regardless of the inherent difficulties in the conflict. To measure affinity, we use S-scores from Erik Gartzke’s Affinity of Nations dataset. S-scores are based on UN General Assembly votes and measure similarity in voting patterns between pairs of countries (Signorino and Ritter 1999; Gartzke 2010). Similarity in UN voting patterns is a commonly used method for measuring the shared political interests between nations. In fact, Signorino and Ritter (1999) point out that UN voting captures informal alignments that may not be manifest in more formal, overt relationships like alliances. The resulting affinity scores have a mean value of 1.362, a maximum value of 1.631, and a minimum value of 0.800.

Heterogeneity is also coded using S-scores. Following the work of Copeland (2010) on the IMF, we calculated a coefficient of variance for each mission year. To capture variation in preferences among the P5, the standard deviation of their S-scores is divided by the mean. The

"These resolutions may also highlight the importance or relevance of a point from Secretary-General reports on the mission."
resultant ratio is a measure of variability in the individual S-scores of the P5 countries. This ratio varies widely with a maximum value of 0.6070 for the Timor-Leste in 2006 and a low of 0.0796 for Rwanda. The mean is 0.3195.

To measure DPKO preferences, we rely on factors that capture the “difficulty” of the conflict to reflect how much international effort is needed. We use three measures that prior studies have argued are associated with difficult conflicts that need peacekeepers more. First, we include the natural log of battle deaths for each conflict as a proxy for the intensity of the conflict. The more battle deaths in a civil conflict, the greater the need for outside assistance. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) show very robust results that peacekeepers tend to go to places that have more battle deaths. If the Security Council truly delegates peacekeeping once a mission begins, we should not find a systematic relationship between the use of oversight measures and the number of battle deaths. If, however, the Security Council imposes more oversight measures as battle deaths increase, then the evidence points to the argument that even within the bureaucracy, the Council uses measures to rein in the DPKO.

The second measure of difficulty reflects the likelihood of conflict resumption. We consider whether the war ends in military victory. Any end to the fighting that does not end in victory suggests that the combatants still have the capacity to resume fighting, which means there is greater need for outside intervention, particularly peacekeepers, whether they are there simply to monitor or enforce the terms of a ceasefire or settlement. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) show very robust results that peacekeepers tend to go to places that have more battle deaths. If the Security Council truly delegates peacekeeping once a mission begins, we should not find a systematic relationship between the use of oversight measures and the number of battle deaths. If, however, the Security Council imposes more oversight measures as battle deaths increase, then the evidence points to the argument that even within the bureaucracy, the Council uses measures to rein in the DPKO.

The time period for the analysis is 1992–2008. Then-Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali established the DPKO in 1992 as one of his first official actions outlined in An Agenda for Peace (United Nations Secretary-General 1992).

Methods

We also code whether the mission is a Chapter VII (enforcement) mission. Enforcement missions are not characterized by resolutions that invoke Chapter VII to impose things like embargoes on other states in dealing with the conflict state. We held to a higher standard, scoring this variable 1 if it invoked Chapter VII to assign enforcement duties and allowed the use “of all necessary means” to achieve their mandate. Because these missions already represent a greater investment by the Security Council, we expect that the Council will want to be clear about the tasks, but they will also be willing to give more time for peacekeepers to have an effect. Therefore, we expect Chapter VII missions to have longer periods between renewals. They may also generate greater resolution specificity on average because they tend to have greater responsibility as a whole.

Finally, we control for the strength of the government army. We anticipate that there will be less oversight in cases where the army is strong for two reasons. First, a strong government army means that the state in question has more capacity for providing its own security. Second, a government with a strong army may be less willing to allow peacekeepers in or to have expansive duties. Both explanations imply smaller missions that need less oversight from the Council.

12 Walter (1997, 2002) demonstrates that some of the most difficult issues in a negotiated peace are over the security of the factions. She recommends third-party security guarantees for settlements because some factions must make themselves vulnerable to their opponents as part of the peace process. If the outcome is clear and the losing side lacks the capacity to restart the war, then peacekeepers are not necessary for the victor to feel secure, nor are they likely to be welcomed by the victors.

13 See Fearon (2004) for an extensive analysis of contraband and civil conflict, in which he argues that contraband makes a negotiated settlement more difficult to reach. See also Fortna (2008). We use Fortna’s data and definitions for contraband.

14 These data were collected from the UN Web site and http://www.globalpolicy.org, an NGO working on UN and Security Council issues.
Prior to 1992, the Office of Special Political Affairs managed peacekeeping missions and was a much smaller, less bureaucratized office. The DPKO’s creation allowed greater opportunity for professional staff to pursue preferences distinct from the Security Council. The early 1990s were also a time of great expansion in the number and scope of missions, potentially increasing mandate flexibility for the DPKO. Data availability dictated the concluding year of the analysis. We employ probit models for dichotomous measures and a negative binomial model for length of extensions and use an ordered probit for the specificity variable.

Recent literature on peacekeeping missions has focused on selection issues to explain why missions are sent to some places but not others. Many previous studies are concerned with peacekeeping outcomes, and thus, the selection issue is potentially crucial, especially if conflicts are more likely to get a mission because they have are more or less difficult to resolve (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). Our question is a bit different, but selection effects may still be present. Missions may go to places where there is greater or less political interest, for example. Without accounting for the effects these factors may have on the decision to send a mission, our results may simply reflect relationships that actually explain where missions go rather than the effects once the mission is established. We suspect, given that past research has repeatedly demonstrated that need trumps politics in the decisions to send peacekeepers, that a substantive effect in our results is likely not capturing a first stage effect. Nevertheless, we perform robustness checks to be sure that our results are stable and include them in an appendix. The time-series cross-sectional character of the data makes correcting for selection effects a complex issue. As robustness checks, we followed and extended Gilligan and Sergenti’s (2008) data in order to create an appropriate sample using matching techniques. We also utilized Copelovitch’s (2010) method of including propensity scores as a right-hand side variable to correct for selection. Our results are consistent across analyses, particularly with respect to the political relationships hypothesized above.

Results

Length of Extension

Time limits are an institutionalized way of revisiting the progress, duties, and resources for peacekeeping missions. We begin by examining the determinants of the length of mission extensions. Because the mean of this data is smaller than the variance (violating a basic assumption of the traditional Poisson model for count data), we utilize a negative binomial regression to deal with over-dispersion. From a substantive point of view, this modeling strategy makes sense as well. Once a mission is extended for a short time period, it is likely that the Security Council will grant short extension again in the future with the same pattern likely to hold for long extension missions as well. These results are presented in Table 1.

In this initial count model, we see that as heterogeneity increases—as the P5 states have more mixed feeling as about the civil war state—the length of the mission extension decreases in line with our expectations. In fact, when heterogeneity on the Council is at its lowest, mission extensions are predicted to exceed 7 months; when heterogeneity is high, extensions are less than 3 months on average, holding the other variables at their means. Surprisingly, however, as affinity increases, the likelihood of a long mission extension also decreases. This seems to run counter to our expectations, but we believe this has more to do with the decision-making process of the Security Council and will be explored further in the next analysis. Generating predicted values, when affinity is at its maximum, the average extension is 12.4 and 2.8 months when affinity is at its minimum.

Civil wars with high fatalities receive shorter mission extensions, as do states with lootable wealth (contraband). On the other side, in civil wars where one side wins a decisive military victory, mission extensions are longer. There are systematic relationships between need factors and monitoring in these results. Further, the direction of effect points strongly to greater monitoring for missions that are likely to be more precarious and result in mission creep. While the presence of lootable resources does have a statistically significant effect on the length of mission extensions, it only decreases extensions by 1 month. Military victory, on the other hand, increases mission extensions from 4.3 to 7.4 months.

When missions have Chapter VII authority, however, extensions are roughly 1.1 months longer. The deaths of peacekeepers have a similar impact on the length of mission extensions. Increasing the number of fatalities from the minimum value (0—with a 0.01 adjustment to make it possible to take the natural log to adjust for skew in this variable) to its maximum (110) increases the length of extensions from 3.8 to 4.8 months. Signals of greater engagement by the United Nation lead to longer mission extensions, which suggests that when the UNSC decides to invest more resources in a conflict, there is also less oversight imposed.

The Presence of Time Limits

Not all missions have time limits attached to them, but the fact that some missions do and others do not is also significant. In the previous analysis, the finding that

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td>-1.925 (0.533)**</td>
<td>-1.735 (0.630)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
<td>-2.312 (0.648)**</td>
<td>-2.113 (0.739)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(UN Fatalities)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.009)**</td>
<td>0.059 (0.021)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ln(UN Troops Deployed)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.039 (0.021)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
<td>0.219 (0.064)**</td>
<td>0.178 (0.090)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeat Mission</td>
<td>0.106 (0.094)</td>
<td>0.095 (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contraband</td>
<td>-0.253 (0.075)**</td>
<td>-0.262 (0.074)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Battle Deaths)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.005)*</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.004)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Government</td>
<td>0.062 (0.044)</td>
<td>0.058 (0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>0.548 (0.198)**</td>
<td>0.453 (0.194)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>-0.111 (0.016)**</td>
<td>-0.107 (0.017)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.032 (0.011)**</td>
<td>0.033 (0.011)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>4.811 (0.887)**</td>
<td>4.215 (1.046)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\theta}(0)$</td>
<td>1018.34</td>
<td>1392.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes. Significance levels: *10%; **5%; and ***1%.)
increased affinity decreases the likelihood of a long extension is surprising, but we believe that this may result from the fact that the states with the highest affinity with the P5 do not have time limits on peacekeeping missions. To test this supposition empirically, we also examine the factors that influence whether or not the Security Council includes a time limit in the framing of peacekeeping missions.

Table 2 shows the results of a probit regression across all resolutions. We conduct the analysis using resolution as the unit of analysis because some missions proceed without time limits and then later have limits imposed, or vice versa. This method allows us to capture those status changes as they happen. As the PA framework suggests, the preferences of the Security Council influence the likelihood of a mandate extension being required. The stronger the affinity between the conflict country and the P5, the less likely it is for a time limit to be imposed, suggesting much greater tolerance for longer missions that allow the DPKO greater latitude to help stabilize peace.

The other consistent predictor in this model is one that concerns the outcome of the conflict. When one side achieves military victory, it is less likely that a time limit will be imposed on the peacekeeping mission. Conversely, wars that end without a victor are likely to be more complicated, and our model suggests these wars are much more likely to have time limits imposed. War termination without victory is associated with greater oversight, which is evidence supporting the claim that the P5 members monitor more difficult cases closely. Conversely, the battle deaths are not systematically associated with the presence of time limits. Our theory suggests this may be evidence for independence, in that more or less battle deaths do not influence whether the Council imposes time limits on the DPKO. Contraband appears marginally significant in the first column, with a negative coefficient. Conflicts with contraband are marginally less likely to get time limits, which we might interpret as evidence for DPKO independence since contraband can exacerbate commitment problems, which would require more investment in the civil war. We emphasize that the results are marginal and turn to other results for further analysis.

### Short Extensions

Finally, we consider the cases where the Security Council delegates least, namely mandate extensions that are shorter than the modal 6-month limit.16 We dichotomize this measure as a short extension if it is less than 6 months and 0 otherwise. Among extensions coded as “short” extensions, the average length is about 2.5 months. The Security Council is interested in keeping a close eye on the progress of peacekeepers as well as the events in these countries. This analysis balances the previous measure, which captures the likelihood of receiving the longest “extension.” This measure shows us what factors are likely to cause close monitoring of a mission, so we capture both ends of our time limit scale.

Table 3 shows the effect various factors have on the likelihood of a short time limit. Most notably, we see the influence of differences of opinion here. When the level of heterogeneity is high, missions are significantly more likely to have short time extensions. If the P5 countries disagree about the conflict country, they are less likely to delegate large amounts of influence to peacekeepers. Complex conflicts that are driven by contraband are also more likely to have short mission extensions. Large missions with many peacekeeping troops deployed are less likely to have short extensions. When the Security Council invests, they tend to delegate sufficient authority to allow the mandate to be fulfilled. In addition, more peacekeepers may be indicative of more complex mandates and tasks, which require more time to be fulfilled.

Using Clarify, we calculated predicted probabilities to compare the effects of the variables (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001). First, all variables were set at their means/medians. The baseline probability for a short extension in an average mission year is about 45%. When the P5 members disagree most about the conflict nation (that is, when heterogeneity is highest), the likelihood of a short extension jumps to 78%. When heterogeneity is at its lowest value, the likelihood of a short extension is only 17%.

### Table 2. Probit Analysis: Presence of Time Limits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
<td>-5.905 (5.061)</td>
<td>-5.317 (5.297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(UnFatalities)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.033)</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(UnTroops Deployed)</td>
<td>-0.087 (0.114)</td>
<td>-0.087 (0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
<td>-0.606 (0.577)</td>
<td>-0.499 (0.704)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeat Mission</td>
<td>0.092 (0.960)</td>
<td>0.191 (0.933)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contraband</td>
<td>-1.534 (0.927)</td>
<td>-1.450 (0.893)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Battle Deaths)</td>
<td>-0.065 (0.065)</td>
<td>-0.061 (0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Government</td>
<td>-0.151 (0.173)</td>
<td>-0.169 (0.182)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>-2.590 (0.731)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Resolutions</td>
<td>0.120 (0.057)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.182 (0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>25.197 (5.744)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                 | 287                 | 286               |
| z_0               | 621.54              | 300.92            |

(Note. Significance levels: *10%; **5%; and ***1%.)

### Table 3. Probit Analysis: Short Mandate Extensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td>2.210 (1.390)</td>
<td>1.498 (1.612)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
<td>3.997 (1.816)*</td>
<td>4.395 (1.871)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(UnFatalities)</td>
<td>-0.075 (0.029)**</td>
<td>-0.258 (0.090)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(UnTroops Deployed)</td>
<td>-0.605 (0.409)</td>
<td>-0.290 (0.471)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
<td>0.066 (0.397)</td>
<td>0.180 (0.326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contraband</td>
<td>0.707 (0.329)*</td>
<td>0.772 (0.261)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Battle Deaths)</td>
<td>0.016 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Government</td>
<td>-0.159 (0.254)</td>
<td>-0.179 (0.238)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>-0.171 (0.952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Resolutions</td>
<td>0.265 (0.056)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>-0.078 (0.028)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-4.370 (2.540)^1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                 | 255                 | 254              |
| z_0               | 170.89              | 162.53           |

(Note. Significance levels: *10%; *5%; and **1%.)

16 The average length of all extensions is less than 6 months.
For comparison, the average conflict does not have a lootable commodity, but for conflicts that do involve contraband commodities, the likelihood of short extensions is 71%. Moving the troops variable from its mean to its maximum decreases the likelihood of a short extension by 23%, but the fact that this variable has been logged affects the direct interpretability of this finding.

Discussion

Our analyses of time limits produce some interesting results that warrant further discussion. When we look closely at the relationships between conflict difficulty and time limits, several patterns emerge. First, results on our measures of conflict difficult generally support Hypothesis 1b. Victory makes a time limit much less likely to be imposed, and it is strongly associated with longer mission extensions. We interpret this result as confirmation that wars that are less likely to resume require less monitoring from the Security Council. Toft (2009) establishes a clear relationship between victory and durable peace in civil wars, which supports the expectation that the losing side is unable to mount a new offensive that could jeopardize the peace, and therefore, wars that end in victory are more likely to remain stable.

Additionally, the presence of contraband also robustly supports Hypothesis 1b. It is negatively signed in the presence of time limits regression, but only marginally significant. The strongest effects appear in the short time limits regression and the count model, where conflicts with contraband are positively associated with shorter mandate extensions. The Security Council monitors these cases much more closely because they represent situations that could resume violence easily if the flow of contraband resumes.

We also introduced a direct measure of UN costs to the regressions to determine whether there is any cost sensitivity that might explain more monitoring. In the count model and short extension regressions, more UN fatalities are associated with longer extensions. Using this direct measure of UN peacekeeping costs, it appears the Security Council is willing to allow more time for a “peacekeeper” effect to take hold, which implies some level of delegation or at least that increasing peacekeeper casualties do not warrant more restrictions on the DPKO. This is somewhat surprising, but it suggests either that peacekeeping costs may not be the primary driver behind P5 behaviors or that those missions represent greater investment and therefore cost tolerance is naturally higher.

Our measures of political affinity give us some important results to consider. First, it is clear that missions in states that share high political affinity with the P5 are unlikely to be constrained by time limits, supporting Hypothesis 2b. This is the clearest evidence of politics influencing the willingness of the Security Council to monitor the DPKO and suggests that independence varies with P5 interests. Beyond this, however, the results are mixed. In the count model, affinity is negatively associated with longer extensions, but this result excludes missions that have no time limits. Further, because affinity has no systematic effect in the short time limits regression, we suggest the count model suffers from a selection effect at the decision to impose a time limit, which is captured by the regression in Table 2.

Heterogeneity among P5 preferences does affect mandate extensions in that it makes shorter extensions more likely. The substantive results suggest a strong shift in the likelihood of a short mandate, which means when P5 members do not agree among themselves; the missions are monitored more closely. These results strongly support Hypothesis 3, which shows that politics among the P5 wield heavy influence on oversight measures. On the whole, the results from these regressions suggest that politics and more direct concerns about excessive agent independence motivate the Council to impose more limits on peacekeeping mission, both to control the DPKO and to prevent any veto member from wielding undue influence in areas of particular interest to themselves.

Mandate Specificity

As a final test of oversight, we compare our factors against mandate restrictions in the form of specificity. To model mandate specificity, we use an ordered probit regression, controlling for the total number of resolutions passed. Recognizing that peacekeeping norms have also evolved over time, we also include a variable for the year in which a resolution was passed. The results are presented in Table 4.

When considering the specificity of the resolutions, we tap into another mechanism of control that the Security Council might try to exercise over the DPKO. When mandates (and thus resolutions) are more specific, agency slack should be curtailed. Stronger affinity with the state where the peacekeeping mission has been deployed decreases specificity, confirming Hypothesis 2b. In these cases, the Security Council appears to be interested in creating long-term solutions and is less concerned about how the DPKO may innovate or adjust its mandate to achieve that outcome. Figure 1 shows the cumulative probabilities of each level of specificity as affinity increases. The wider the band is, the more likely the outcome is. This figure shows that higher affinity is associated with less restrictive resolutions, while lower affinity is associated with more detailed resolutions. Heterogeneity of preferences is not a significant predictor of specificity; thus, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. The Security Council seems to go to great lengths to curtail various sources of agency slack in accordance with its collective interests.

<p>| Table 4. Ordered Probit, Mandate Specificity |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td>-2.298 (0.912)**</td>
<td>-2.275 (0.904)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
<td>-0.931 (1.070)</td>
<td>-0.926 (1.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(UN Fatalities)</td>
<td>-0.016 (0.024)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(UN Troops Deployed)</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.119)</td>
<td>-0.035 (0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
<td>-0.099 (0.174)</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeat Mission</td>
<td>-0.204 (0.168)</td>
<td>-0.251 (0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contraband</td>
<td>-0.049 (0.200)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Battle Deaths)</td>
<td>0.036 (0.012)**</td>
<td>0.037 (0.013)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Government</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.116)</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Victory</td>
<td>0.066 (0.455)</td>
<td>0.066 (0.453)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolutions</td>
<td>-0.100 (0.029)**</td>
<td>-0.098 (0.025)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.051 (0.025)*</td>
<td>0.049 (0.024)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-333.79</td>
<td>-331.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\chi}^2_{10}$</td>
<td>209.80</td>
<td>599.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note. Significance levels: *10%; **5%; and ***1%).
In addition to the preferences of the members of the Security Council, the nature of the civil war also influences the specificity of mandates. High numbers of battle deaths are associated with higher specificity. As battle deaths increase, the Security Council is inclined to increase its control over the DPKO.

Prior to 1992, the majority of the peacekeeping missions undertaken by the UN had been traditional missions. In the early 1990s, missions became much more complex involving peace enforcement. Under the tenure of Kofi Annan, there clearly emerged a new norm of humanitarian intervention (Findlay 2002). The practices of peacekeeping have evolved over the period covered by this study. The resolutions relating to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), authorized in August 1992, are much less specific than those establishing the UN's presence in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999. As the tasks have become more complex, the UNSC has required an expanded vocabulary as well as clearer chains of command, more detailed descriptions of responsibilities, and more opportunities for external review of mission activities.

**Conclusions**

In the debate over institutional independence, our results show that the United Nations has yet to achieve such freedom from the influence of powerful states. Principal preferences matter throughout the life of a peacekeeping mission. The relationships are consistent across measures of peacekeeping oversight. Direct political relationships influence how peacekeeping missions are managed, as does the variance across P5 preferences. Greater apathy toward a civil war state elicits greater restrictions, both in time limits and tasks. But our results also offer a unique point about P5 interests and bureaucratic independence. UN independence is not dichotomous; rather, independence is shaped by the intensity of P5 interests. When the P5 have a strong interest in a civil war state, the UN tends to have much greater autonomy in conducting the mission, whereas missions that suffer from P5 apathy are much more controlled. Thus, bureaucratic independence is more nuanced than previous studies have allowed, and while it seems clear that P5 interests influence missions, additional evidence suggests that those interests do not wholly eliminate institutional independence and in fact create missions with wide latitude and unlimited time to carry out their mandates.

Measures of conflict difficulty reinforce evidence of the Security Council's influence. Factors measuring how difficult a conflict is systematically show that the Council manages these missions more closely, even though these are the same factors that others have used to predict where missions go to demonstrate institutional independence. Higher battle deaths result in shorter time extensions and more specific mandates. Likewise, contraband is associated with shorter mission extensions. Victory, the most consistent predictor of lasting peace across conflict studies, is also a robust predictor of fewer restrictions across measures of time limits. In all, the evidence suggests the Council makes a concerted effort to manage missions in more precarious circumstances, potentially at the expense of the overall mission. A caveat to our results shows that the Council does not appear to require more frequent monitoring to manage direct peacekeeping costs. Measures of UN fatalities and deployments, as well as whether the mission has an enforcement mandate, are all associated with greater latitude. These measures likely capture interests indirectly, however, because they represent significant investments in a civil war peace process.

Our results also show that the Council is concerned about a potential source of *de facto* independence that they have tried to control in that higher heterogeneity means shorter mandate extensions. The contentious relationships among the P5 suggest these delegations may be very sensitive to the bureaucratic structures that could allow for agency slack. The relationships between heterogeneity and oversight support this interpretation of delegation behavior and explain why greater heterogeneity results in more frequent reviews of peacekeeping missions.

Our analyses offer an alternative perspective for how we might capture politics in the UN. With few exceptions, recent work on UN politics has suggested that the institution's goals are more and more important while state preferences have abated, with the further implication that these developments have led to peacekeeping efforts in places where they are most needed. We do not
contradict these conclusions; however, the evidence suggests that once the mission is in place, P5 politics still weigh heavily on the conduct and latitude of the mission. If P5 politics influence the conduct of the mission, then they naturally must influence the outcomes as well. Thus, future studies of UN behavior should treat the institution as a multifaceted, complex bureaucracy rather than as a monolithic institution with unified purpose and preferences.

References


